src=”http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js”>
Introduction
Good governance comprises the rule of law, effective state institutions, transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs, respect for human rights, and the meaningful participation of all citizens in the political processes of their countries and in decisions affecting their lives (Babst, DV, 1964: 9-14).
In the past, the idea of holding free and fair elections has dominated the thinking and therefore the means and the goals of most operations (Gibson, 1998). Just as there are many definitions of peacekeeping, there are also many definitions of democracy (Zakaria, 1997:22). A “democratically elected” government is all that many people require for democracy (Zakaria, 1997:22). For them, the modern view of democracy is satisfied once elections are held. However, further inquiry into the subject will often elicit other requirements for true democracy–requirements such as the rule of law, protection of individual and human rights, protection of minority rights, separation of governmental powers, checks and balances of power, and protection of private property rights.
Clearly, something more than elections are required before a country can be said to have a democratic government–rather than merely having a democratically-elected government. It is “liberal democracy” that has the power to bring lasting peace and stability that can come from mere free and fair elections. The term democracy, as used in this paper, refers to a liberal democracy that is designed not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. It is a democracy based on fundamental human rights, sound governmental structures that control the powers of those who govern, and the rule of law. Basically, liberal democracy is a form of representative democracy where elected legislative body that hold the power to decide are moderated by a constitution that accentuates defending individual autonomy and the minorities’ rights in society.
Discussion
Liberal democracy is now the leading form of government not only in the West but also in the Union Soviet community. Moreover, it shows to be gaining significant ground in other parts of the world (Zakaria, F. 1997: 22). Despite this scattering pressure, there is a variety of heaviness that has the potential to threaten liberal democratic systems, even in well established organisation. Undoubtedly, in cases where constitutional government is still in its influential stages, as in Russia, liberal and democratic practices are liable to encounter major obstacles.
Constitution-making has become an international and comparative exercise in a way that it rarely was in the century before 1989. International in the sense that the involvement of experts and practitioners across state boundaries has been welcomed, indeed encouraged, to the point at which a new democracy that excluded foreigners entirely from its constitutional process might stamp itself as definitely insular, even fairly expect. The post-1989 period has been a time of constitutional liberation. In this period, democracy has been marketed aggressively as a product that ought to be available to everyone. Even if purchases of off-the-shelf varieties are a bit dangerous and tailor-made versions are preferred, the implication is that those with less experience can profit from consulting those with more (Reynolds, 2002: 152).
Western governments have been forthcoming with assistance although some, fearing being held responsible for the results, were slow off the mark; a spate of non-governmental organisations has sprung up to meet the demand and to create it where it was slow to arise; the United Nations and other international organisations have responded; and professional bodies such as the American Bar Association have gathered groups of merchants, lawyers, and judges eager to give out ready-made constitutional passages on appeal. If the nineteenth was the century of Christian missionaries, the twenty-first may be considered as the century of constitutional missionaries (Reynolds, 2002: 152). If it is true that designs are not generally adopted, that does not render constitutional design an unimportant subject. It is a naive view of the relation of ideas to institutions that concludes that ideas are insignificant just because organisations do not reflect them completely or rapidly. The intricate pathway of democracy itself, from 1680 to 1789 to 1989, makes this clear enough. Ideas are contested by other ideas, ideas are met with a variety of non-ideational barriers, and even ideas that survive these tests must go further: they must be put in adoptable forms, they must be legitimised by opinion leaders and opinion-leading states, and they must be seen to be in the interests of those who must approve their adoption before they find their way into institutions (Reynolds, 2002: 150-160).
In the case of constitutional design, the battle of ideas is not over, non-ideational obstacles are strong, it is still early days in terms of constitutional iterations, the interests affected by adoption are not uniform, and retrogression is possible after adoption. As Nigerians looked to the United States in 1978, so, too, have many countries aimed to resemble Switzerland rather than Nigeria, even though their problems may have resembled Nigeria’s more than Switzerland’s. Success attracts admirers, although success may imply an easier problem that may have made possible the adoption of institutions that are held, in retrospect, to be responsible for the success. Severely divided societies need to look to other severely divided societies that have made some progress in reducing conflict, rather than to societies that are less severely divided, especially if the reduction of divisions in the less divided countries can causally be attributed to political institutions that antedate the onset of democracy (Reynolds, 2002: 150-160).
Democracy is something that is not easily achieved and not easily maintained. Protecting democracy is one of the aims of the state (Gleditsch, NP 1995: 321). One of the means to protect democracy is through surveillance of the threats to the state.
In current usage, democracy is often described to be the similar as liberal democracy. This existing idea of democracy to a large degree changes from how the term was at first defined and used by the ancient Greeks in the Athenian democracy political establishment. On the other hand, some individual speculate that the link between peace and democracy may be due to the geographic proximity of Western democracies, or to their high degree of economic development, or to intensive mutual trade. This is a claim that there is an intermediate variable in the democracy-peace correlation. Conversely, Nils Petter Gleditsch (1995) eradicated geographic distance as a factor.
On the other hand, several individuals believe that there is no system that can preferably arrange society and that democracy is not ethically ideal. Moreover, the essence of democracy is the belief that if a majority is in conformity, it is acceptable to harm the minority. The opposition to this point of view say that in a liberal democracy where conscientious minority groups are restricted from being targeted, majorities and minorities in fact obtain a perceptibly different form on every issue; therefore, majorities will generally be cautious to take into account the contest of the minority, lest they eventually grow to be part of a minority on a potential democratic verdict.
Actually, liberalism is the view according to which states exist primarily for the sake of protecting individuals and their rights (Zakaria, F. 1997:22). That is, on the liberal view, states exist not for the sake of the salvation of individuals, but rather for the sake of creating and maintaining conditions under which each individual can live as he sees fit or according to his own conception of the good life, within the constraint that he respects the right of others to do the same. In line with this, some may argue that liberal democracy is not actually democratic or even liberal especially in making serious decision in which the general welfare is at stake. Let say for example, in war, the majorities cannot insist or cast votes to push minorities to war in order to make them safe. But we can only say that liberal democracy can guarantee the individual liberties of its citizens and prevent the development into a dictatorship.
Apparently, there are global political events point toward the need to give serious philosophical attention to the relationship between human rights, democracy, and peace. While each of these ideals has independently enjoyed expanding recognition since the end of the Second World War, there has also been widespread reluctance to assert a necessary linkage between them. Much of the reluctance stems from the persistent tension that exists in the international system between the universality of human rights and the traditional primacy of state sovereignty.
Further, it is very important to remember that democracy and peace are not timeless but historical social concepts. Although some may explain war as a result of innate violence, as structured aggression it assumes socially-controlled use, and originates in definite historical forms. For political scientists no less than for political practitioners, peace and democracy often seem to be natural partners. We are told that democracies do not go to war with each other, and the prospects of armed conflicts are said to be further enhanced by the high profile of the military in many non-democratic regimes.
Conclusions
In conclusion, a significant point to be raised here is that even though democracies hardly, if ever, go to war with each other, they are generally hostile to non-democracies. As a result, democracies are hardly immune from engaging in war, at least with non-democracies. In Kant’s view, the peaceful resolution of conflicts is a characteristic of “mature,” stable democracies that reject the incessant preparation for war and embrace the ideals of social justice and nonviolence. Actually, liberal democracy or any other type of democracy aims to prohibit war and promotes welfare of its people. The possibility for attaining a just and lasting peace for all peoples is one reason since it would be permissible, indeed obligatory, for mature democracies (or those democracies striving for maturity) to exert greater diplomatic and legal pressure for democratic reform and the protection of equal human rights. In other words, actively promoting global democracy and human rights is essential to the pursuit of perpetual peace.
Basically, attaining world’s peace is merely a hard thing to achieve. Actually, peace is not in democracy or even in liberal type of democracy but it is on how a certain state or individual practiced any type of democracy.
References:
Babst, Dean V.,(1964). “Elective Governments: A Force for Peace,” Wisconsin Sociologist, pp. 9-14.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter (1995), “Geography, Democracy, and Peace,”International Interactions, Vol. 20, pp. 297 323.
Reynolds, A. (Ed.). (2002). The architecture of democracy: constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 150-161.
Gibson, S. (1998) The Misplaced Reliance on Free and Fair Elections in Nation Building: The Role of Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of Law. Houston Journal of International Law, Vol. 21.
Zakaria, F. (Nov.-Dec. 1997) The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign affairs. 22.
Credit:ivythesis.typepad.com
0 comments:
Post a Comment