Research Articles Base: Thesis Hypothesis

Thesis Hypothesis Sample

Thesis Hypothesis Sample

Hypothesis The study intends to test the hypothesis: “Has the proliferation of intranet had a positive or negative effect on ...

Chapter Outlines Here are some suggested chapter heading and subheadings and they must be regarded as minimal of what we expect to find in your work   The whole project (excluding appendices) must not exceed 15,000 words, counting from the chapter 1 heading to the last page before the appendices begin.  The University does not suggest word counts for each chapter because they tend to vary enormously with the topic being covered so it has no value. As a Master’s student you are supposed to have become expert and in that sense you should know instinctively when you have said all that is necessary in each chapter.   Caution These notes to help you rather as a sort of checklist, they are not to be used in is a careless manner as if you have no thinking ability of your own or want to take any short cut you can get. This is Master’s level and so we expect you to exercise high level thinking skills not just mindlessly copy what is written here.   Basic Chapters These are the usual chapters we expect to find for a whole project. You can add appendices as necessary but here I just show the ones which are almost always required.   Chapter 1 – Introduction and problem outline Chapter 2 – Literature Review Chapter 3 – Research Design Chapter 4 – Presentation of data and generation of results Chapter 5 – Evaluation of outcome and practice Chapter 6 – Conclusions and Generalizations   Appendices Project Specification and project schedule, Glossary, References list Bibliography   Other items that might be included in an appendix are: Inclusions (copies of relevant documents such as policies, invoice layouts, diagrams etc), Sample Questionnaires, Summary interview transcripts, Details Evaluation scripts, Requirement catalogues, summarised primary data sets, etc   Chapter 1 (Scene setting and outlining the basic Research elements) All the following must be covered although you do not have to use these sub-headings   1.1      Introduction 1.2      Presenting problem and its causes 1.3      Target 1.4      Overview of Primary Data 1.5      Research Approach, hypotheses 1.6       Planned Outcome and Actors 1.7      Strategic Business IT (Demonstrate that the outcome is/will lead to a strategic use of IT) 1.8      Scope and Scale 1.9      Ethical Overview 1.10  Research Question 1.11  Aim and Objectives 1.12  Summary and link to next chapter       Chapter 2 (Preparing for research by becoming a topic area expert) All the following must be covered although you do not have to use these particular sub-headings. Normally there are two major areas to be covered: the direct topic such as Real Estate and the Strategic Business  IT elements which in this case might be about supporting IT infrastructures or products for that industry.   2.1      Introduction to topic area 2.2      Originality Theme (Based on personal viewpoints/idea/Experiences etc) 2.3      Topic aspect 1 2.4      Topic aspect 2 2.5      Topic aspect ‘n’ etc (usually about 5 to 10 topic aspects are used) 2.6      Past Research in this area 2.7      Statistical Review (if necessary) 2.8      Summary and review conclusions   Keep in mind that this work must be thorough otherwise you will simply not have the necessary knowledge to decide what data to use or how to interpret that data when you get it. It should also be noted that this is about using primary sources such as Journals, government papers, manufacturer’s guidance notes and so on although books may also be included. Please do not use unreliable internet sources such a Wikipedia as that will be regarded by the University as a gross error and cannot be called serious academic preparation.   Chapter 3 (Research Design defining a process or model definition to get your intended outcome) This is a critical chapter, often done badly so careful work is needed if your design is to be credible.   Its KEY element (3.6) is the model or process you define to transform your primary data into your intended outcome; if this element is unclear or vague or missing you will not be able to pass the project. Do not fall into the mindless trap of thinking that just be saying “I will look at the primary data and ..” or “I will do a detailed and in-depth analysis of the data…” because such descriptions are so general and so vague that they are meaningless and worthless in explaining what exactly you will do to get to your intended outcome.   3.1 Introduction (focused on reminding your readers what your project outcome is supposed to be) 3.2 Discussion on Primary spotlight and Activity 3.3 Research Method selection and Justification 3.4 Primary data collection method and protocol 3.5 Ethical Review of Outline plan 3.6 Primary Data Pre-processing (define how you will organises and structure your raw data) 3.7 Post-Processing (to generate your defined outcome) 3.8 Closing remarks   You should be aware that section 3.4 will vary considerably in its detailed structure depending upon the research method chosen. Here are some typical sub-sections that might be found in most designs.   3.4.1 Detailed Discussion of Primary Data (based on you spotlight and activity) 3.4.2 Localisation (discussion of where the data might be located and how it might be accessed) 3.4.3 Primary Data Collection (discussion as to how the data can be reliably collected) 3.4.4 Data Presentation Methods (discussion as to how the raw data will be presented for processing)   Chapter 4 (Presentation of your primary data and generated outcome) In this chapter you display your primary data in charts or table or other suitable means and finally use your defined outcome processing. It is essential that we see the research design in use here; if the design cannot be seen to have been used you cannot pass the project.   4.1 Introductory Remarks 4.2 Presentation of pre-processed data (see design section 3.5) 4.3 Presentation of your outcome based on the post-processing process Although this looks simple each section has to be accompanied by some explanations as to what all this data means. The KEY point is that you must demonstrate that your processing design was clear and unambiguous and that it was used carefully by you to deal with both processing stages. If the University cannot see that you used a reliable model or process to get your outcome then you cannot pass the project.   Chapter 5 (Evaluating your outcome and practice) This is a critical chapter as it shows whether you can look back at your work with a reflective and critical mind. It is very important to realise that evaluating the outcome is a paper exercise because it is done BEFORE the outcome is used whilst the practice evaluation is real because its represents serious reflection on the actual research activity. Here I only give an outline and further details can be found in the workbook; don’t ignore this, go and look that section up.   At this stage the evaluation is project specific; it’s about what you produced and how you produced it and as such it must not stray into conclusions (which is about generalisations of your results).   5.1 Introductory Remarks 5.2 Evaluation of outcome 5.3 Evaluation Practice 5.4 Overview   It is hard to be precise as to what might be covered in each section but the following is a typical way of dealing with the outcome but remember this is all done as a paper exercise by considering in defined ways your outcome and testing it BEFORE it us used. Please be careful here as these factors can look like they just need a yes/no answer but that is not the case you have to test your outcome and argue or make a case for it in each section.   5.2.1 Expected Outcome Functionality and Efficacy (will it do what is intended/needed) 5.2.2 Usability (is the outcome likely to be easy to use by its actors) 5.2.3 Standards (does the outcome fulfil the pertinent requirements of any standards-making bodies) 5.2.4 Expected Effects (does it affect mean changes in policy, process, structure or attitudes) 5.2.5 Systemically Desirable (will the outcome improve the whole problem setting in some way) 5.2.5 Culturally Feasible (will the outcome when used prove to be acceptable to those affected by it) 5.2.6 Ethicality (is the use of the outcome ethical, within accepted codes of practice and the law) 5.2.7 Elegant (is the outcome pleasing or more simply did you do a good job in producing the outcome).   Again It is hard to be precise as to what might be covered in each section but the following is a typical way of dealing with project practice but remember this is a real exercise as it was you who used the various techniques and methods to get the outcome. Please be careful here as these factors can look like they just need a yes/no answer but that is not the case you have to test your practice and argue or make a case in each section.   The MAIN activity here will focus on the model or method you used to generate your organised and structured data collection from the raw data and then a model or process to generate the outcome from the organised collection and how well they performed and were they really suitable. This is why if you don’t have a clear design for getting your outcome then this section will fail.   There are dozens of areas that might be covered but it’s not usually possible to comment on every single thing you did so it’s best to pick out the outliers or the main things that you leaned or what went wrong but here are several possibilities.   5.3.2    Literature Preparation (omissions, misunderstandings, sources reliable and current etc). 5.3.3    Primary Data Definition (did you define the data well, did you get good coverage, etc) 5.3.4    Choices Made (reflect on Research Method, Approach and Style, collection, sample size etc). 5.3.5    Collection Protocol (how did this go in practice, were selection criteria accurate, sample size etc) 5.3.6    Pre-Processing (was it easy, were your processing and data organisational idea right or wrong etc) 5.3.7    Outcome Processing (how easy was it to generate your Outcome etc) 5.3.8    Statistical Analysis (if used) 5.3.9    Experience (how did the research experiences/lack of it influence the results/quality of work) 5.3.10 Research Tools and Models (were all the various tools, models, processes useful etc). 5.3.11 Ethics and Anonymity (did your correctly identify all the ethical issues, unforeseen problems etc) 5.3.12 Administration (how well did planning go here, did I contact the right people, etc).   Chapter 6 (Conclusions and Generalisations) Chapter 5 was about evaluation and that was SPECIFIC to just your project, its data and its outcome. In conclusions you are trying to logically go beyond that and say what it means in the wider world.   The heart of the problem is how we can logically go from specific instances to reach general conclusions. How can we possibly know that what we have observed in our necessarily limited research on given objects and events be enough to enable us to figure out or derive their more general properties. That is, suppose you use your primary data to build a model of human/computer technology relationships. Well that is fine but that model was built using a tiny set from the possible data population so how logically can you get from there to making predication about its use in the wider world of you own company and elsewhere.   Before listing possible sub-sections it is very important that you understand that what you do here to obtain generalizations is almost totally dependent on a thorough literature review coupled with a carefully thought out and executed Research Design; without those you are simply too ignorant of the subject area to use your results and then write anything that might be interesting to read and certainly no way you will add to the general knowledge pool.   6. 1 Project Results overview (be careful here not to end up repeating what is in chapter 4) 6.2 Overview of practice and Lessons learned (don’t just repeat the evaluation section here, generalise) 6.3 Further Research 6.4 Generalisations 6.5 Summary   It is hard to be precise but the basic strategy is to use your topic area knowledge and then write a comment on it by referring to your results. So roughly speaking you might say formulaically “it has been generally agreed that X is a useful strategy to combat Y but based on the results presented here it seems that we also need to include some consideration of Z because….” Now PLEASE be aware this is just a hint as your work may be nothing to do with strategies but the idea or form here is often useful as a way of thinking an item through but be flexible and don’t be afraid to construct logically other ways to express your ideas and certainly notice the ‘because’ as without that you have no argument to present about your findings.   Possible areas to do this might be considered in the light of you topic area knowledge and you results:   New meanings, originality, implications, new/modified principles, limitations, new/modified theorisations, indications of best practice, lessons learned, indications of the need for further work, implication for law or standards, warning or cautions, advice, caveats, values, ethics, factors or features including cultural ones, usage and user psychology and other things that might occur to you.  So we might write:   6.4.1 Implication for X 6.4.2 Indications of Best Practice 6.4.3 Implication for Company Standards on Technology Acquisition 6.4.4 User Psychology Perspective on IT etc Credit:ivythesis.typepad.com

Chapter Outlines

Chapter Outlines Here are some suggested chapter heading and subheadings and they must be regarded as minimal of what we expect to find ...

Revised chapter 1:Shopping Paradise—Are Mainland China Tourists Satisfied with the Shopping Service Quality?

Chapter 1 Introduction   1.1  Background 1.1.1  Tourism Development in Hong Kong             Hong Kong is considered as one of the most successful regions in terms of tourism industry in the world. The city received a total of 25.25 million tourists visits in 2006, including the visitors from mainland China. It helped to generate a total of HK7.3 billion or US billion in income. Therefore it made the tourism industry as the second largest generator of foreign currency (Cochrane 2008, p. 260). In 2007, the industry showed a continuous increase in terms of the number of visitors. In September of the year, there are some 2,120,350 visitors that have arrived in Hong Kong, showing a great increase of 15.9% from previous rate, while the from January 1 up to present arrivals have reached 20,363,764, showing an increase of 9.6% year-on-year (Business Monitor International, 2008).             Hong Kong is known as the Shopping Paradise attracting thousands of travellers from all over the world. It is one of the most important pillars of the economy of the city. The situation had improved due to the implementation of Individual Visit Scheme (IVS) of the government of China, which allows the citizen of mainland China, to visit Hong Kong in individual basis. Prior to that, people of mainland China, travel by group or business visa. Since then, Hong Kong had become the favourite destination of Mainland Chinese tourists (Hong Kong Economic Times, 2006). The situation has created a tremendous business opportunities to the tourism industry of the city. In 2004, there are about 2.6 million of individual document holders from Chinese mainland that have visited the city since the implementation of the IVS. Furthermore, the scheme had already brought a total of HK.6 billon worth of revenues (People, 2004). According to the Hong Kong Tourism Board (2006), Mainland China reached 58.8% out of the total tourists in the city by the end of 2006 (see Appendix I).             The growing influence of the Mainland Chinese visitors is the primary reason why different players in the tourism industry is focusing on the behaviours, demands and desires of the Mainland Chinese visitors in the process of their decision-making.   Figure 1.1   Comparison of Actual Number of Visitors (Extract from Appendix I) 1.1.2        Hong Kong Shopping Tourism and Mainland Chinese Tourists             Shopping is considered as the most common and enjoyable activities undertaken by people during holidays, and in most cases, it provides a major attraction and basic motivation for travel. Due to the current growth and development of efficient transportation systems, the Internet, and widespread use of credit cards, people have been able to travel different places in order to shop (Timothy, 2005, p. 1976).             Shopping plays an important role in the field of tourism. This is due to the fact that, Jansen-Verbeke stated that for many tourists, an integral part or even the entire purpose of their travel or visit is shopping. In addition, shopping is a major time-use for many of the tourists, despite of their primary motivation for travel (as cited from Theobald, 1998, p. 405).             Hong Kong is considered as one of the most fascinating, product-diverse, and accommodating shopping destinations in the world. These are the reasons why the city has been dubbed as a shopper’s paradise (Timothy, 2005, p. 1980).             Shopping in Hong Kong is one of the most important activities for the Mainland Chinese due to the fact that, Hong Kong has no sales tax, luxury goods can be 10% to 20% cheaper than in China that raised its taxes towards the cosmetic products from 20% to 50% (Chan, 2008). The said condition can be seen from the statistics that have been released and reported by the Hong Kong Tourism Board that during the first half of 2008, the same-day visitors made up close to half of all the arrivals from the Mainland China from 41% of the last year (Chan, 2008). Furthermore, people from Mainland China believe that Hong Kong is a major trend setter in terms of fashion and style.             Tourists from mainland China, spend most of their money on shopping when they come to Hong Kong. During 1996, shopping took the 63% of the total expenditures. From 1996 to 2001, visitors in the city is spending more and more on shopping, that had increased to 64% during 2001 (Zhang & Pine, 2005, p. 74). This shows that shopping is considered as one of the most important motivation of the Mainland Chinese visitors in the city. Table 1 shows other important spending activities of tourists in Hong Kong. Activities Spending Percentage (1996) Spending Percentage (2001) Shopping 63% 64% Hotel 17% 15% Meals Outside Hotel 11% 13% Source: (Zhang & Pine, 2005, p. 74)   Chinese visitors are likely to stay in less expensive hotels and devote more of their money in spending for different luxury goods, dedicating a large 73% of their outlay to shopping (Chan, 2008). It shows that shopping has a strong influence and motivation towards the mainland Chinese travellers in Hong Kong. It is obvious that that shopping travel has become one of the most important activities by tourists in the city. Since the culture, consumer behaviour, and expenditure patterns of Mainland Chinese might be different from those from other countries, it is critical for the retail shops to provide tailor-made service in order to attract them to buy the products and services. It would be the primary concern of the Hong Kong tourism industry. Therefore, service quality plays an important role in increasing Hong Kong s’ tourism industry and attracting the largest inbound tourist market – Mainland Chinese. Previous observations indicated that customer satisfaction will lead to changes of decision-makers in the tourism industry (Zhang & Chow, 2004). It is necessary to analyse if this group of tourists are satisfied with the service quality experience in Hong Kong, and make recommendations to the retail shops on how to modify or improve their service quality in order to attract them. 1.2  Problem Statement There are many retail shops in Hong Kong. There are no limitations or restrictions on which one can or cannot serve tourists. In fact, tourists have no limitation whatsoever in choosing which shop to buy from. Some service providers might be especially trained to deal with different nationalities of tourists, while some others do not focus in serving tourists. All of them are facing the same situation; where in, tourists from Mainland China can walk in and select whatever they want for as long as they are satisfied with the products and services. Therefore service quality in this research will apply to all retail shop service providers in Hong Kong whether their target customers are tourists or not. Although there have been a few studies exploring service quality of many service sectors in Hong Kong, such as tour guide (Zhang & Chow, 2004), travel agents (Lam & Zhang, 1999), and the hotel industry (Qu &Sit, 2007), little attention has been paid to shopping service. As shopping has become one of the most important motivations for Mainland Chinese to travel Hong Kong, it is therefore critical to examine tourists’ satisfaction with shopping service and enrich the knowledge in this field. 1.3  Research Objectives The aim of this research is to examine whether Mainland China tourists are satisfied with their shopping experience, and whether they are satisfied with the service quality in the retail shop of Hong Kong. The research is expected to achieve the following objectives.  1)      To identify the critical success factors for retail service providers in servicing Mainland China tourists; 2)      To examine Mainland China tourists satisfaction with the service quality in the retail shop; 3)      To identify methods for the retail shop to build customer satisfaction for Mainland China tourists; 4)      To provide implications to decision-makers in the retail shop on how to enhance service quality to attract Mainland China tourists. 1.4            Significance of the Study This study conducts a comprehensive approach in order to examine the Chinese tourists’ satisfaction with the quality of shopping service in Hong Kong. The findings of this study will provide both academic and empirical contributions. Academically, the result of this study will help to generate information on the concept that customer satisfaction. Empirically, this study serves as a valuable source of information on how the Hong Kong retail shop may change its service quality in order to cater the culture and consumer behaviour of the Mainland China tourists. With regard to the student, this research will enhance his knowledge and understanding regarding the service quality and tourism that will serve as a preparation for better career prospects in the future.     References   Chan, S 2008, Chinese Tourists Spend Big in Hong Kong, BusinessWeek (July 23), viewed 20 October 2008, <http://www.businessweek.com/globalb iz/content/jul2008/gb20080723_568870.htm>   Cochrane, J 2008, Asian Tourism: Growth and Change, Elsevier   HK Individual Visit Scheme 2004, People, viewed 20 October 2008, < http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200407/29/eng20040729_151214.html>   Hong Kong Economic Times (2006). Decent Business Environment in Hong Kong after 1997. Hong Kong Economic Times. Hong Kong, p.A2.   Timothy,D 2005, Shopping Tourism, Retailing, and Leisure, Channel View Publications   The Hong Kong Tourism Report 2008 2008, Business Monitor International, viewed 20 October 2008, < http://www.businessmonitor.com/tourism/ hongkong.html>   Theobald, W 1998, Global Touris: The Next Decade, Butterworth-Heinemann   Zhang, H.Q. & Chow, I. (2004). Application of importance – performance model in tour guides’ performance: evidence from Chinese outbound tourists in Hong Kong. Tourism Management, 25(1), 81-91.   Zhang, H Q, Pine R & Lam, T 2005, Tourism and Hotel Development in China: From Political to Economic Success, Haworth Press       Appendices: APPENDIX I   COMPARISON OF TOTAL INBOUND VISITORS FROM CHINA AND ALL OTHER COUNTRIES TO HONG KONG   Year Visitors arriving from China Annual growth % Total visitors arriving from all other countries Annual growth % Share of China visitors % 1984 214,854 - 3,303,719 - 6.1 1985 308,978 43.8 3,656,717 10.0 7.8 1986 363,479 17.6 4,052,641 10.0 7.0 1987 484,592 33.3 4,917,044 17.5 9.0 1988 683,604 41.1 6,167,221 5.4 10.0 1989 730,408 6.8 5,984,501 -3.0 10.9 1990 754,376 3.3 6,580,850 10.0 10.3 1991 835,062 16.0 6,795,413 3.3 10.9 1992 1,149,002 31.3 8,010,524 17.9 12.5 1993 1,732,978 50.8 8,937,500 11.6 17.2 1994 1,943,678 12.2 9,331,156 4.4 17.2 1995 2,243,245 15.4 10,199,994 9.3 18.0 1996 2,311,184 3.0 10,662,580 4.5 17.8 1997 2,297,128 0.6 8,976,249 -15.8 20.4 1998 2,597,442 12.9 7,562,204 -15.8 25.6 1999 3,083,859 18.7 8,244,413 9.0 27.2 2000 3,785,845 22.8 9,273,632 12.5 29.0 2001 4,448,583 17.5 9,276,749 0.0 32.4 2002 6,825,200 53.4 9,741,182 5.0 41.2 2003 8,467,200 24.1 7,069,639 -27.4 54.5 2004 12,245,862 44.6 9,564,768 35.3 56.1 2005 12,541,400 2.4 10,818,017 13.1 53.7 2006 13,590,000 8.4 11,660,000 7.8 53.8 Compound growth/annum   20.7%   5.9%     Source     A Statistical Review of Tourism, 1984-2006, Hong Kong Tourism Board     Credit:ivythesis.typepad.com

Revised chapter 1:Shopping Paradise—Are Mainland China Tourists Satisfied with the Shopping Service Quality?

Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Background 1.1.1 Tourism Development in Hong Kong Hong Kong is considered as one of the mo...

Thesis Hypothesis on Institutional Barriers to Small Scale Business Development

Institutional barriers to small scale business development Institutional barriers for small businesses must be examined in an individual, country specific context.   Studies have been conducted on several developing nations on barriers to the development of small businesses.  There are several characteristics that are common among the different nations which prompt the barriers on business development.  In Brazil, for instance, some of the barriers for operations and growth of companies include taxation and regulations followed by government policy instability and uncertainty (Campos, Nauro F.  and Iootty, Mariana.  Institutional barriers to firm entry and exit: Case-study evidence from the Bartliain textiles and electronics industries.  21 August, 2007.  https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fmulyagusdin.terapad.com%2Fresources%2F67269%2Fassets%2Fdocuments%2F101-Econ.Dev.%2520Readings%2F4_Institutions%2520and%2520entry%2520-%2520%2520exit%2520in%2520Brazil.pdf, retrieved 25 April, 2011.)”  “In Tanzania, a mismatch is observed between economic policy reforms and restructuring of the institutional framework (Institutional Barriers to Small-Scale Business Development: A Need for Flexibility in Tanzanian Tax and Regulatory Systems.    http://www.deepdyve.com/lp/sage/institutional-barriers-to-small-scale-business-development-a-need-for-dsrAMafxd9?autoClickRent=true, accessed 25 April, 2011.)”  “Most developing countries can be characterized as ‘neo-patrimonial’ in the sense that much authority is highly personalized rather than rule-based and bureaucratic.  This is extremely tricky for businesses because the presumed need for a fairly competitive and open ‘playing field’ field for business might conflict with the more personalized state-business relations that are found more often in a patrimonial state.  (Hare, Paul G.  Business Development in Four Developing Countries:  Institutional Barriers and Supports.  September 2006.  https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sml.hw.ac.uk%2Fecopgh%2FIPPG-DSA%2520Conf%2CNov2006.pdf, accessed 25 April, 2011. 5)” The three hypotheses which point to the aspects of the development process which are oftentimes neglected or under-estimated, and which is also why policy advice is often too similar between countries and the reason behind why it often fails include the following: ·         “The costs and complexity of doing business are often very high and discourages potential beneficial economic activity.  Institutional arrangement which result in high costs are damaging to economic performance.  Their diligence depends on the political-economic structures which are very slow to change. ·         The lack of modern institutions to manage risk results in firms that remain too small and habitually informal, farms which are over-diversified and technically inefficient. The result is low incomes and low rates of income growth. ·         Whether privatization proves to be beneficial for the economy or not depends on post-privatization ownership structures and on the quality of the regulatory and competitive environment in which the privatized firms find themselves in. (Hare, Paul G.  Business Development in Four Developing Countries:  Institutional Barriers and Supports.  September 2006.  https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sml.hw.ac.uk%2Fecopgh%2FIPPG-DSA%2520Conf%2CNov2006.pdf, accessed 25 April, 2011. 5)” In Mali, Compagnie Malienne pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles (CMDT) works with many small farms concerned with cotton growing.  Office du Niger (ODN) deals with farms that grow rice on irrigated land.  “These are key economic activities in Mali and based on the studies of CMDT and ODN, Mali is comprised of ‘farms within firms’.  (Hare, Paul G.  Business Development in Four Developing Countries:  Institutional Barriers and Supports.  September 2006.  https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sml.hw.ac.uk%2Fecopgh%2FIPPG-DSA%2520Conf%2CNov2006.pdf, accessed 25 April, 2011. 7)” CMDT has a vertically integrated research-production-marketing structure which is considered a success.  The usage of local extension agents to promote technology diffusion and the spread of best practice as well as the use of pricing schedules that rewarded farmers for sorting their cotton by quality is what contributes to this accomplishment.  However the future of CMDT is a very politically sensitive issue as there are complaints that CMDT surpluses have not been useful to develop the infrastructure in the cotton-growing areas. ODN initially worked in the same way as CMDT however over time the practice has changed.  “They no longer maintain a vertically integrated monopoly in its operations, ODN maintains and develops the irrigation system and supplies water to farmers, but the latter no longer has to sell their rice to ODN for threshing, husking and marketing.  (Hare, Paul G.  Business Development in Four Developing Countries:  Institutional Barriers and Supports.  September 2006.  https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sml.hw.ac.uk%2Fecopgh%2FIPPG-DSA%2520Conf%2CNov2006.pdf, accessed 25 April, 2011. 7)” Other problems have risen as well including needing to diversify crops because the production of rice is insufficient to meet the needs of the farming families.  Also, property rights to the land are not clear with ODN’s disinclination to cede individual farmers full rights.  Leasing land to foreign companies was not successful.  “ODN is considered to be highly corrupt. (Hare, Paul G.  Business Development in Four Developing Countries:  Institutional Barriers and Supports.  September 2006.  https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sml.hw.ac.uk%2Fecopgh%2FIPPG-DSA%2520Conf%2CNov2006.pdf, accessed 25 April, 2011. 8)” In Tanzania, in comparison to its neighboring East African countries (Kenya, Uganda and Sub-Saharan Africa average), companies are of the opinion that access to electricity, tax administration, business licensing and permits, and corruption are big constraints on their operations and growth.  “Business licensing and permits were viewed as severe constraint by firms in Tanzania (27.4%), relative to firms in Kenya (15.2%), Uganda (10.1%) and the SSA average (13.7%).  This finding is in line with Tanzania’s poor regulatory quality which shows that specific institutions which matter most for companies in their investment activities are particularly weak.  (Hare, Paul G.  Business Development in Four Developing Countries:  Institutional Barriers and Supports.  September 2006.  https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sml.hw.ac.uk%2Fecopgh%2FIPPG-DSA%2520Conf%2CNov2006.pdf, accessed 25 April, 2011. 8)”   Credit:ivythesis.typepad.com

Thesis Hypothesis on Institutional Barriers to Small Scale Business Development

Institutional barriers to small scale business development Institutional barriers for small businesses must be examined in an individua...

Thesis Chapter 1 :Do the salaries of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and other board members affect company performance?

CHAPTER 1   PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND   Introduction In recent years, chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration has come under increasingly close and harsh scrutiny, both in the academic literature and the popular press.[1] The popular business press has tended to portray executive salary and benefits as excessive[2] or out of control[3] and has generally supported legislative initiatives aimed at reform. Such attempts include the recent U.S. political decision to question the corporate tax deductibility of executive salaries above million and the efforts of some firms to limit CEO compensation to a multiplier of entry-level-employee compensation. Opponents of these efforts, often economists, decry the visible hand of regulation in the presumably economic decision about the level of CEO compensation[4] and, in the case of multiplier limits, suggest that there is efficiency in structuring compensation in large organizations as “tournaments” in which compensation at higher levels is much greater than that at lower levels.[5] This debate has expanded to include long-term incentive remuneration, which has become an increasingly significant component of executive pay.[6] Once viewed by most observers as connoting managerial value and devotion to shareholders’ interests,[7] long-term incentive plans have recently been negatively portrayed as insidious devices that serve only to enrich top management at the expense of shareholders.[8] Such trenchant criticism has helped create widespread skepticism among corporate stakeholders about the motivation for long-term incentives while bolstering legislative efforts to curtail their use.  Jensen and Murphy[9] have suggested that firms are deterred from making full use of long-term incentive plans for CEOs because of the threat of “media criticism and ridicule,” which they view as a regrettable form of “implicit regulation.” Thus debate surrounding CEO remuneration reflects the tension between the economic efficiency of an ideally constructed compensation contract versus the alleged political reality of entrenched, overcompensated CEOs and weak boards. In this study, we argue for the need to consider a third perspective: the possibility that CEO compensation debates are also driven by symbolic considerations. From a symbolic management perspective, the concern about whether CEOs in large U.S. corporations are overpaid or “worth every nickel they get”[10] is less important than how firms communicate the rationales underlying their CEO compensation decisions. According to this perspective, existing CEO compensation debates typically revolve around the subjective assessment of whether CEO compensation decisions can be considered “justifiable” in the eyes of organizational stakeholders and appeal less to economic logic than to the subjective social perception that some fixed amount or multiplier is the limit of what constitutes justifiable compensation for a CEO. Compensation beyond that amount could be subject to different interpretations by different stakeholders, some negative and some positive. Very high CEO compensation could be viewed either as an indication of corruption in the upper echelons of management or as a deserved reward for an extraordinary CEO. Thus, given ambiguity about the purpose or implications of high CEO rewards, new incentive arrangements that increase the upper bound of CEO compensation levels represent a justification problem (or opportunity) for corporate leaders. Accordingly, there may be value in studying not only how and how much firms decide to compensate their CEOs but also how firms explain their compensation decisions to shareholders and other interested constituents, including stock analysts, governmental regulators, governance activists, and prospective shareholders. To illustrate, a study of Belliveau et al.[11] hypothesized that high social similarity between a CEO and a remuneration committee chairperson would be positively related to the overall level of CEO compensation. Similarly, Zajac and Westphal[12] found that the demographic similarity between a firm’s CEO and board of directors affects the explanation the board uses to justify the adoption of a long-term incentive plan (stock options, performance shares, and bonuses) for the CEO. Specifically, they found that when the board of directors is demographically similar to the CEO they are more likely to use human resource explanations (e.g., the need to attract talented persons) when adopting a long-term incentive plan. On the other hand, if the board is less demographically similar to the CEO, they are more likely to use agency explanations (e.g., the need for motivation) when adopting a long-term incentive plan. Finally, Daily et al.[13] found that the composition of the compensation committee (affiliated directors and CEOs) affect the level as well as the structure of the remuneration package that is afforded the CEO.   Background of the study Agency theory[14] provides an initial framework for understanding the relationship between boards of directors and CEOs.[15] It has been used by scholars in disciplines such as economics,[16] finance,[17] marketing,[18] strategic management,[19] and sociology.[20] Briefly, agency theory attempts to explain the agency relationship in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another party (the agent). Problems develop in agency relationships when the goals, interests, and risk-preference of the principal and agent diverge, with the principal being unable to verify that the agent has acted appropriately. These problems may be reduced when the contract between the principal and agent provides rewards for the agent that is contingent on the outcomes achieved and the principal has information to verify agent behavior. In these cases, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal.[21] From an agency theory perspective, boards of directors may be viewed as devices by which shareholders or owners (i.e., principals) monitor and reward the actions of CEOs (i.e., agents). CEOs may place their own interests over shareholder interests in a variety of ways. For example, they may shirk their work responsibilities in favor of leisure time[22] or consume excessive perquisites such as corporate jets.[23] They may also make decisions in accordance with the shorter time horizon associated with their expected job tenure rather than the longer time horizon that is optimal for the firm.[24] Further, CEOs may forego risky investments to protect their jobs. The desire to protect their employment stems from their high level of firm-specific investment in human capital. CEOs develop a variety of skills that are specific to the firm in which they serve, such as specialized training and experience, as well as knowledge of and ability to work in a specific organizational culture.[25] Although most shareholders hold diversified portfolios, most CEOs have only one job.[26] Accordingly, they may avoid risks to protect their own employment, even at the expense of shareholder return. Boards of directors are responsible for ensuring that CEOs fulfill their responsibilities to the firm. Apart from dismissal, which is generally exercised as an option only after other strategies have failed, boards have one primary means of controlling CEO performance: they may design incentive contracts that reward CEOs for good organizational performance.[27] However, it should be noted that although the dominant theory in corporate governance research is agency theory, other theoretical frameworks have been suggested as well.[28] For example, stewardship theory suggests that managers are not motivated by self-interested behavior but are effective stewards of organizations whose goals are consistent with those of shareholders.[29] In this case there would be less need for performance-based pay. Nonetheless, the predominant position is that noncontingent composition is generally preferred by CEOs[30] because it provides a stable, less risky, income stream.[31] Thus, all else being equal, CEOs prefer a weak link between pay and performance.[32] When pay and performance are decoupled, CEOs may pursue their own interests with lower risk and greater flexibility.[33] Agency theory suggests that the more closely CEO pay reflects organizational performance, the more ably the compensation committee has fulfilled its function. [34] In spite of the theoretical rationale for performance-based CEO pay, researchers have found little connection between CEO pay and firm performance.[35] The lack of performance-based CEO compensation has been a major source of public concern,[36] largely because CEOs are much less likely than their workers to take a cut in pay when the firm falls on hard times.[37] To shed light on the ways in which CEO pay and performance are decoupled, researchers must pay more attention to the processes underlying compensation decisions.[38] For example, the relationship between the board and the CEO is likely to impact the pay-performance link.[39] One way to evaluate that relationship is to draw from theory and research on the effects of relational demography. [40]From that perspective, compensation committee member s who are more similar in demographic characteristics to the CEO may be more likely to adopt compensation practices that CEOs prefer; that is, they are likely to establish less of a linkage between CEO pay and organizational performance.[41]   Statement of the Problem This study intends to investigate the relationship of the Chief Executive Officers’ (CEO) and other board member’s remuneration to company performance. Specifically, the study intends to answer the following questions. 1.                            How do the remuneration programs of the firm affect the performance of the company? 2.                            What are the different remuneration schemes used by the firms? 3.                            How does the administrative department of every firm assess the suitable remuneration plan for a CEO and a Board Member? 4.                            What is the level of motivation of the CEOs and the board members in relation to their respective remuneration schemes? 5.                            What is the relationship of remuneration to the performance of the CEOs and other board members?   Hypothesis The study seeks to test the following null hypothesis: “The CEO and Board Members’ remuneration is inversely related to the company’s performance.”   Data Analysis             The data for this study consists of the table on the average salaries, compensation, bonuses and other benefits received by CEOs. Data will be retrieved from magazines, journal articles and company websites and shall be compared using diagrams and tables. From this, a comparative analysis shall be made on the remuneration for CEOs on the average. Furthermore, the salaries of managers and ordinary employees will be diagramed for comparisons to that of CEOs.             The survey questionnaire used for this study shall be consist of three parts- the demographic profile of the CEOs, their perception on their compensation and their perception on their performance. The items will be graded using a 5-point Likert scale format. The survey questionnaire distributed to the CEOs will be analyzed using the frequency, weighted mean, chi-square and ANOVA in testing the significance of the CEO compensation and their responses to the questions and in testing the significant correlation between remuneration and performance of CEOs. Moreover, performance shall be rated using weighted mean and ANOVA.   Scope and Limitations The study intends investigate the relationship of the Chief Executive Officers’ (CEO) and other board member’s salary to company performance. For this study, primary research and secondary research will be used. Primary research will be conducted using anonymous questionnaires that will be sent to selected managers of multinational corporations based in the UK. The questionnaires will be used to collect quantitative data and the interviews will be used to provide qualitative insights into the data collected. The data will be analyzed and compiled for the correlation of the hypothesis. The data will then be presented by means of graphical representations and illustration and the difference would be highlighted. A negative correlation between the variables would suggest that the hypothesis is null, that is, The CEO and Board Members’ salary is inversely related to the company’s performance. Moreover, this study is subject to several limitations. The first limitation is that salary, bonus, and executive stock options are the only components of compensation that are considered. Although these components of compensation account for more than eighty-percent of total CEO compensation (Economist, 1994), it would be informative to also consider other forms of compensation such as restricted stock and payouts under long-term incentive plans. This study does not consider long-term performance. The movement toward longer-term incentive plans suggests that even stronger results could be obtained by incorporating long-term performance measures into the analysis. This study considers only a subset of short-term performance measures. Other factors, such as changes in the level of customer service and satisfaction, may have a greater influence on compensation than the measures used in this study. The ways in which compensation structure affects performance are not considered here. This study is naive in the sense that virtually no statistical study can consider all of the factors that enter into compensation decisions. Additional variables such as intra- and inter-industry comparisons, interest rates, economic growth, and executive labor market conditions play an important role in compensation decisions. To the extent possible, compensation committees should extend the regression models in this study to incorporate the additional variables that are most applicable to the executive whose compensation is being examined. Finally, although this study proposes a methodology for comparing pay levels among CEOs, it does not address the issue of the appropriateness of the level of CEO pay in comparison to that of other workers.   Definition of Terms Benefits: A payment or entitlement, such as one made under an insurance policy or employment agreement, or public assistance program. Or, more generally, something of value or usefulness. Board of Directors; Individuals elected by a corporation’s shareholders to oversee the management of the corporation. The members of a Board of Directors are paid in cash and/or stock, meet several times each year, and assume legal responsibility for corporate activities.  CEO (Chief Executive Officer): The CEO (Chief Executive Officer) is often but not always also the President of a company. The CEO reports to the Chairman of the Board and board members. The CEO is usually the most important spokesperson for the company, the person who is responsible for quarterly results, and the best paid member of the company. Chairman of the Board: The highest-ranking officer in a corporation’s board of directors. Presides over corporate meetings. Sometimes has executive authority over a firm, sometimes does not. Remuneration: The total monetary value an employee receives. Shareholder: One who owns shares of stocks in a corporation or mutual fund. For corporations, along with the ownership comes a right to declared dividends and the right to vote on certain company matters, including the board of directors. Salary: Wages received on a regular basis, usually weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly. Sometimes the term is used to include other benefits, including insurance and a retirement plan. BIBLIOGRAPHY Amihud, Y. and B. Lev. (1981) “Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions.” Journal of Finance 42: 234-254.   Barkema, H.G. and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. (1998) “Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance: A General Research Framework.” Academy of Management Journal 41: 135- 145.   Basu, A., R. Lal, V. Srinivasin and R. Staelin. (1985). “Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective.” Marketing 4: 267-291.   Belliveau, M.A., C.A. O’Reilly III and J.B. Wade. (1996). “Social Capital At the Top: Effects of Social Similarity and Status on CEO Compensation.” Academy of Management Journal 83: 1568-1593.   Business Week. (1992) “Executive pay.” March 30: 52-58.   Coffee, J.C. 1988. “Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In the Corporate Web.” In Knights, Raiders, and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover. Eds. J.C. Coffee, L. Lowenstein and S. Rose-Ackerman. NewYork, NY: Oxford University Press.   Crystal, G. (1991) In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives. New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Co.   Daily, C.M., J.L. Johnson, A.E. Ellstrand and D.R. Dalton. (1998). “Compensation Committee Composition As a Determinant of CEO Compensation.” Academy of Management Journal 41: 209-220.   Davis, J. H., F. D. Schoorman, and L. Donaldson. (1997) “Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management.” Academy of Management Review 22: 20-47.   Eccles, R. (1985). “Transfer Pricing As a Problem of Agency.” In Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business. Eds. J. Pratt and R. Zeckerhauser. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.   Economist. 1994. “Considering the Options.” (July 30): 70-71.   Eisenhardt, K.M.(1989). “Agency Theory: Assessment and Review.” Academy of Management Review 14: 57-74.   Fama, Eugene F. (1980) “Agency problems and the theory of the firm.” Journal of Political Economy, 88: 288-307.   Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1994) “Executive Compensation: A Reassessment and a Future Research Agenda.” In Research in Personnel and Human Resource Management. Ed. C. K Ferris. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.   Gray, S.R. and A.A. Cannella. (1997) “The Role of Risk in Executive Compensation.” Journal of Management 23: 517-540.   Hill, C. and P. Phan. (1991) “CEO Tenure As a Determinant of CEO Pay.” Academy of Management Journal 34: 707-717.   Jackson, S.E., J.F. Brett, V.I. Sessa, D.M. Cooper, J.A. Julin and K. Peyronnin. (1991). “Some Differences Make a Difference: Individual Dissimilarity and Group Heterogeneity as Correlates of Recruitment, Promotions, and Turnover. “Journal of Applied Psychology 76: 675-89.   Jarrell, Gregg A. (1993)”An overview of the executive compensation debate.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5: 76 82.   Jensen, M., and K. Murphy. (1990). “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives.” Journal of Political Economy (April): 225-264.   Jensen, M.C. W.H. Meckling. (1976) “Theory Of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Finance 3: 305-350.   Jensen, M.C.(1988). “The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence.” In Knights, Raiders, and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover. Eds. J.C. Coffee, L. Lowenstein and S. Rose-Ackerman. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.   Kosnik, R.D.(1987). “Greenmail: A Study in Board Performance in Corporate Governance.” Administrative Science Quarterly 32: 163-185.   Lazear, Edward, and Sherwin Rosen (1981) “Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts.” Journal of Political Economy, 89: 841 864.   Murphy, Kevin J. (1986)”Top executives are worth every nickel they get.” Harvard Business Review, 64(21: 125-132.   O’Reilly, C. A. I., D. F. Caldwell and W. P. Barnett. 1989. “Work Group Demography, Social Integration, and Turnover.” Administrative Science Quarterly 34: 21-37.   Pearce, J., W. Stevenson and J. Perry. (1985) “Managerial Compensation Based On Organizational Performance: A Time Series Analysis of The Effects of Merit Pay.” Academy of Management Journal 28: 261-278.   Spence, A.M. and R Zeckhauser. (1971). “Insurance, Information, and Individual Action.” American Economic Review 61: 380-387.   Tosi, H. L. and L. R Gomez-Mejia. (1994). “CEO Compensation Monitoring and Firm Performance.” Academy of Management Journal 37: 1002-1016.   Tsui, A.S. and C.A. O’Reilly. (1989) “Beyond Simple Demographic Effects: The Importance of Relational Demography in Superior-Subordinate Dyads.” Academy of Management Journal 32: 402-423.   Ungson, G. and R. Steers. (1984) “Motivation and Politics in Executive Compensation.” Academy of Management Review 9: 313-323.   Wiseman, R.M. and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. (1998) “A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking.” Academy of Management Review 23: 133-153.   Zajac, E.J. and J.D. Westphal.( 1995). “Accounting for Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and Symbolism.” Administrative Science Quarterly 40: 283-308.   		 		 		[1] 		Jensen, M., and K. Murphy. (1990). “Performance Pay and Top-Management 		Incentives.” Journal of Political Economy (April): 225-264. 		 		 		[2] 		Crystal, G. (1991) In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American 		Executives. New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Co. 		 		 		[3] 		Business Week. 		(1992) “Executive pay.” March 30: 52-58. 		 		 		[4] 		Jarrell, Gregg A. (1993)”An overview of the executive compensation 		debate.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5: 76 82. 		 		 		[5] 		Lazear, Edward, and Sherwin Rosen (1981) “Rank-order tournaments as 		optimum labor contracts.” Journal of Political Economy, 89: 841 		864. 		 		 		[6] 		Supra. Jarrell (1993) 		 		 		[7] 		Supra. Crystal (1991) 		 		 		[8] 		Ibid. Supra, Business Week (1992) 		 		 		[9] 		Supra. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 		 		 		[10] 		Murphy, Kevin J. (1986)”Top executives are worth every nickel they get.” 		Harvard Business Review, 64(21: 125-132. 		 		 		[11] 		Belliveau, 		M.A., C.A. O’Reilly III and J.B. Wade. (1996). “Social Capital At the 		Top: Effects of Social Similarity and Status on CEO Compensation.” 		Academy of Management Journal 83: 1568-1593. 		  		 		 		[12] 		Zajac, E.J. and J.D. Westphal.( 1995). 		“Accounting for Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and 		Symbolism.” Administrative Science Quarterly 40: 283-308. 		  		 		 		[13] 		Daily, C.M., J.L. Johnson, A.E. 		Ellstrand and D.R. Dalton. (1998). “Compensation Committee Composition 		As a Determinant of CEO Compensation.” Academy of Management Journal 		41: 209-220. 		  		 		 		[14] 		Eisenhardt, K.M.(1989). “Agency Theory: Assessment and Review.” 		Academy of Management Review 14: 57-74.; Jensen, M.C. W.H. Meckling. 		(1976) “Theory Of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 		Ownership Structure.” Journal of Finance 3: 305-350. 		 		 		 		[15] 		Ibid. Supra, Daily (1998). 		 		 		[16] 		Spence, A.M. and R Zeckhauser. (1971). “Insurance, Information, and 		Individual Action.” American Economic Review 61: 380-387. 		 		 		 		[17] 		Fama, Eugene F. (1980) “Agency problems and the theory of the firm.” 		Journal of Political Economy, 88: 288-307. 		 		 		[18] 		Basu, A., R. Lal, V. Srinivasin and R. Staelin. (1985). “Salesforce 		Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective.” Marketing 		4: 267-291. 		 		 		[19] 		Kosnik, R.D.(1987). “Greenmail: A Study in Board Performance in 		Corporate Governance.” Administrative Science Quarterly 32: 		163-185. 		 		 		[20] 		Eccles, R. (1985). “Transfer Pricing As a Problem of Agency.” In 		Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business. Eds. J. Pratt and 		R. Zeckerhauser. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 		 		 		[21] 		Supra. Eisenhardt (1989). 		 		 		[22] 		Supra. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 		 		 		[23] 		Jensen, M.C.(1988). “The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence.” 		In Knights, Raiders, and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover. 		Eds. J.C. Coffee, L. Lowenstein and S. Rose-Ackerman. New York, NY: 		Oxford University Press. 		 		 		[24] 		Supra. Jensen and Meckling (1976). 		 		 		[25] 		Coffee, J.C. 1988. “Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In the 		Corporate Web.” In Knights, Raiders, and Targets: The Impact of the 		Hostile Takeover. Eds. J.C. Coffee, L. Lowenstein and S. 		Rose-Ackerman. NewYork, NY: Oxford University Press. 		 		 		[26] 		Amihud, Y. and B. Lev. (1981) “Managerial Incentives and Corporate 		Investment and Financing Decisions.” Journal of Finance 42: 		234-254. 		 		 		[27] 		Supra. Walsh and Seward. (1990) 		 		 		[28] 		Supra. Davis (1998); Davis, J. H., F. D. Schoorman, and L. Donaldson. 		(1997) “Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management.” Academy of 		Management Review 22: 20-47.; O’Reilly, C. A. I., D. F. Caldwell and 		W. P. Barnett. 1989. “Work Group Demography, Social Integration, and 		Turnover.” Administrative Science Quarterly 34: 21-37. 		 		 		[29] 		Ibid. Davis (1997). 		 		 		[30] 		Supra Daily (1998); Tosi, H. L. and L. R Gomez-Mejia. (1994). “CEO 		Compensation Monitoring and Firm Performance.” Academy of Management 		Journal 37: 1002-1016. 		 		 		[31] 		Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1994) “Executive Compensation: A Reassessment and a 		Future Research Agenda.” In Research in Personnel and Human Resource 		Management. Ed. C. K Ferris. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.; Gray, S.R. 		and A.A. Cannella. (1997) “The Role of Risk in Executive Compensation.” 		Journal of Management 23: 517-540. 		 		 		[32] 		Supra Gray and Canella (1997); Daily (1998): Hill, C. and P. Phan. 		(1991) “CEO Tenure As a Determinant of CEO Pay.” Academy of 		Management Journal 34: 707-717. 		 		 		[33] 		Supra (Daily et al., 1998; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989) 		 		 		[34] 		Supra. Gray and Canella (1997); Barkema, H.G. and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. 		(1998) “Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance: A General Research 		Framework.” Academy of Management Journal 41: 135- 145.; Wiseman, 		R.M. and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. (1998) “A Behavioral Agency Model of 		Managerial Risk Taking.” Academy of Management Review 23: 		133-153. 		 		 		[35] 		Supra. Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 		(1998) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) 		 		 		[36] 		Ungson, G. and R. Steers. (1984) “Motivation and Politics in Executive 		Compensation.” Academy of Management Review 9: 313-323.; Pearce, 		J., W. Stevenson and J. Perry. (1985) “Managerial Compensation Based On 		Organizational Performance: A Time Series Analysis of The Effects of 		Merit Pay.” Academy of Management Journal 28: 261-278. 		 		 		[37] 		Supra. Crystal (1991) 		 		 		[38] 		Supra. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989 		 		 		[39] 		Supra. Ungson and Steers (1984) 		 		 		[40] 		Jackson, S.E., J.F. Brett, V.I. Sessa, D.M. Cooper, J.A. Julin and K. 		Peyronnin. (1991). “Some Differences Make a Difference: Individual 		Dissimilarity and Group Heterogeneity as Correlates of Recruitment, 		Promotions, and Turnover. “Journal of Applied Psychology 76: 		675-89.; Tsui, A.S. and C.A. O’Reilly. (1989) “Beyond Simple Demographic 		Effects: The Importance of Relational Demography in Superior-Subordinate 		Dyads.” Academy of Management Journal 32: 402-423. 		 		 		[41] 		Supra. Daily (1998). Credit:ivythesis.typepad.com

Thesis Chapter 1 :Do the salaries of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and other board members affect company performance?

CHAPTER 1 PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND Introduction In recent years, chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration has come under increa...