Al-Qaeda as a form of organised crime and its extent
Terrorism is an international plague that affects many if not all aspects of contemporary people and societies. The discourses and political debates on terrorism as crime and as political violence boil down to increased efforts on continuous expansion of academic and legal perplexity on the subject. Higgie (2005, pp. 2) argues that terrorism is not a new threat as it occurred as early as 1900s where debates on its actual definition widely transpired among international leaders, policy-makers, lawyers, diplomats, and organisations and other experts. The terrorism that leaders talked about in the past 35 years is different from that of today. It is significantly noted that many presidents and prime ministers were called terrorists when they were young and fighting for independence. Then, the terrible events of September 11, 2001 brought home the truth to the world on what and how international terrorism is, particularly illuminating on its international framework or organisation and similarly in its effects (Sharma 2001). Due to the 9/11 incident, terrorism as crime and as political violence had opened up doors for deeper analysis and discussion, thus resulting to growing number of literatures focused on the subject area.
Everyone knows for a fact that terrorism brought threat on international security not only among governments but also business organisations and its management that reflected to the world economic state of affairs (Burke 2005). After the series of disastrous terror incidents, the world was once again awakened in their deep slumber on the harmful potentialities of terrorism and its related activities. The earlier years when terrorism became a significant part or agenda of various organisations and institutions like United Nations (UN) were much more different and deterrent to the traditional views and characterisations. In this new century, Higgie (2005, pp. 2) reported that “terrorism’s global reach, its level of organisation, the sheer scale of the attacks that these transnational terrorists are able to commit, and the access that some of the groups have to funds” makes it an entirely new global plague. Higgie attributed globalisation as primary determinant of this transformation that changed the nature of terrorism in contrast to the past years. Today, the presence of the terrorists’ attacks and threat of terrorism is a global concern and also considered as all-out war. Much has been given to address the various effects of this phenomenon especially to almost all aspects of the modern society. Understanding terrorism as crime and political violence is an elementary foundation of its clearer understanding. In order for someone to comprehend what terrorism is, basic definitions and general characterisations were provided.
Terrorism, in terms of definition, is subject for argumentation as there were many factors considered in providing an accurate and comprehensive meaning. Dedeoglu (2003) found out that there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism. Both different people and countries have different views of the same behaviours in this arena. It is relative yet it comprises common indicators and attributes like threat or violence directed against innocent people and/or property, creating high anxiety in the victims, and advancing political or other goals (Beinin 2003; Awofeso et al 2002; Townshend 2002; Schmid 1996). By looking on the broad literatures and attempts of defining terrorism, “the main aspects of global terrorism seem to include: (1) a non-military group of people united in a common cause, (2) who operates in a clandestine manner, (3) to commit or threaten to commit acts of significant violence, (4) against innocent civilians, (5) terrorists do not abide by civil laws or formal rules of conduct, (6) seek to produce fear, and (7) seek to influence others toward a particular political, religious, or ideological course of action” (Kondrasuk et al 2005, pp. 265). Similar definition was generally conceptualized by Goodwin (2006) as, “Terrorism refers to acts of violence that are intended to kill indiscriminately ordinary civilians, and to frighten others, for political ends; it is thus quite different from guerrilla warfare, political assassination, and other strategies of insurgency that have military and political targets” (pp. 315). These two definitions work for the purposes of the discussion provided in the subsequent parts of this report.
Looking on the definitions provided above, terrorism as crime and as political violence is differentiated. The common denominators of the various descriptions provided by authors, i.e. threat or violence on innocent people and/or property and anxiety in the victims, suggest that it is a crime itself as it practically violates human rights. The sheerest up to the most complex indication of threat or violence is a crime. Terrorism is a crime whichever angle should it be scrutinised. Should it be organised or not, terrorism as a form of crime is universally unacceptable. On the other hand, terrorism is a political violence because the definitions provided indicate the advancement of political or other goals through given actions that categorise it as such. While in the earlier years, presidents and prime ministers were called terrorists in fighting for freedom, this is not tantamount on what is actually identified as terrorism now. Terrorism as political violence is not mainly focused on fighting for freedom but on the means on how the actions or activities were exercised to achieve freedom. It is a basic argument of “how the ends do justifies the means?” While it is true that terrorism is often politically motivated, not all political violence is terrorism. In the 1970s, terrorism is a “legitimate political act of opposition” for some states and “synonymous with crime and was to be prosecuted” for others (Lodge 2002, pp. 52). Preliminary deviation and adversity over whether or not terrorism represents a political act or a crime led to common knowledge that it is a criminal act and should not be tolerated. The extent of terrorist activities is another factor to consider on concluding terrorism as crime and as political violence.
The subject of terrorism will never be complete without the presence and involvement of people and their organisations that were called terrorists. Pedahzur and colleagues (2002) contended that new terrorist group formation reached its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, slowed down in the 1990s where fewer new groups were formed, but those that did were more likely to be religious-based such as Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. However, terrorist groups operated long before then and had its origins and evolution in various regions of the world namely Middle East, Asia, Europe, Africa, Australia, South and North America (Kondrasuk et al 2005). One of the world’s notorious terrorist organisations, Al-Qaeda is an international grouping of Islamic revolutionary formed in Afghanistan in 1989 by Osama bin Laden (Kondarsuk et al 2005) (see Appendix). Thus, this paper delves particularly on the extent of terrorism as organised crime using Al-Qaeda as point of reference. It provides body of information on the decentralized network form of organisation and links between terrorist and organised crime groups. Subliminally indicated, the state of affairs and motives of Al-Qaeda were also included to reflect on the political inclination of terrorism.
The extent of Al-Qaeda as a form of organised crime
Most literatures affirmed that Al-Qaeda, aside from terrorist group, is also a notable criminal organisation that is engaged in activities like trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism (Lee 2003; Raab & Milward 2003; Abuza 2002). It was clearly established that Al-Qaeda is considered as organised crime group due to its composition, activities and state of affairs. The extent of this classification is dependent on the end that was brought about by the means used. With the following discussion, the extent of Al-Qaeda network in terms of organised crime is illuminated.
Thorne (2005, pp. 596) quoted President George W. Bush (2001) during the aftermath of 9/11 that bin Laden’s “Al-Qaeda is to terrorism” while “Mafia is to crime”. According to Thorne, both the Mafia and Al-Qaeda were caught up in many legal and illegal businesses where most of their illegal businesses were considered organised crimes. Ironically, their illegal businesses were legal in form. Most of the time, they were admired by the global communities and authorities. Organised crime and many terrorist organisations – like Al-Qaeda and Mafia – were involved and may have significant contributions to world’s largest industries working for prohibited and dangerous trade such as arms and people smuggling; prostitution; money laundering and illegal drugs, and both make extensive and effective use of cyberspace and information technology (Thorne 2005). The manner in which they transact across various locations by using the computer technologies is too structured that it makes them difficult to obliterate.
The Al-Qaeda, its associated networks and other terrorist organisations alike seem to have no clear geographic location (Bergen 2001) or they tend to relocate more often. This can served as a qualification to be an organised crime group. Their organisation is scattered yet it constitute a solitary command control that make them work as one unit regardless of their locations. Surprisingly, their amorphous organisation is very structured. Organised crime seems to be an elusive “network of agreements between groups” (Sifakis 1999, pp. 233). Both terrorist and organised crime organisations outsource non-core activities. Mafia as similar to Al-Qaeda and other groups were connected with other organisations and individuals in their supply of resources and distribution networks where they contribute to information inside their individual networks, or “loose affiliations” of other organisations and individuals who are sometimes their friendly associates or allies and at other times and circumstances, their competitors (Parker 1995).
Smith (2002) provided details on how Al-Qaeda operates in an easy, horizontal composition of more than 20 essential terror networks yet distinctly combined with a recognized vertical leadership and control structure. The leadership authorities do not actually work or involved less work on ‘‘doing’’ terrorism instead they were more about financial support and cultivating its scattered and loosely attached networks that would eventually work for the attainment of Al-Qaeda’s vision on its behalf. Gunaratna (2002, pp. 54) described Al-Qaeda is “characterised by a broad-based ideology, a novel structure, a robust capacity for regeneration and a diverse membership that cuts across national boundaries”. Harrison (2005, pp. 9) identified the unique attributes of Al-Qaeda as an organisation including its inherent capacity to act rapidly in response to an ever changing socio-political circumstance, the primary concern about worldwide security is a direct effect of their activities, and its heightened ability to shape the outside environment. Raab and Milward (2003) hypothesised that Al-Qaeda and the smuggling of “blood diamonds” to swap over illegal weapons in the failed states of West Africa has in some ways associated. There are a number of preliminary evidences as result of investigations and intelligence reports regarding this group’s activity as deemed organised. It is apparent that organised crimes and their participants contravene on the existing legal standards (i.e. laws and policies) in the Western world particularly in the U.S. and that they have caused great harm and inconvenience on many innocent individuals. Looking on the case of other organised groups and their activities, organised crime and drug-trafficking operations have been described in network analytic terms (like the works of Jackson et al 1996; Klerks 2001). Al-Qaeda’s membership seems to be reasonably different considering various aspects such as ethnicity, nationality, and overall social environment (Klerks 2001). Conversely, Klerks specified two striking and surprising qualities of Al-Qaeda as a terrorist network. First, Al-Qaeda possesses the outward ability to make use of people who have blended into their particular societies and have not been getting in touch with the core organisation for years. This makes it different and much more precarious for Western countries. Second, Al-Qaeda seems to have a distinctive way of planning and executing complex operations over a very long period of time while constantly keeping up with the commitment and motivation of their operatives. An outstanding example is seen on the cases of suicide missions in an antagonistic environment.
Al-Qaeda is an organised form of crime. The evidence that suggests its function as an umbrella organisation that initiates attacks is palpable. It is compared to “hollow corporation model” in terms of structure (Business Week 1986; Milward & Proven 2000, pp. 362), where the most essential functions were deliberately directed to finance, planning, strategy, and marketing but where the functioning units were comparatively independent and work under contractual connection with the corporation. Their attacks were actually organised and carried out in an extraordinarily decentralised fashion, rather independently, as compared to the deeds of project teams in a corporate setting. Klerks (2001) further explicated that the command and control configuration of the network itself appears to be similar to a more traditional hierarchy or corporate structure with a plain division of labour that included a leader (bin Laden), a council of about a dozen of able and specialised advisers, and specially designated committees or persons accountable for the execution of “military operations, religious affairs, finances, and the production of false travel and identity documents” (New York Times 2001a, B4).
The extent of measuring Al-Qaeda’s characterisation as organised form of crime is seen on how it uses all the previously mentioned approaches in motivating individuals and ensuring arrangements were carried out. The sense of organisation or framework in relation to identity and belongingness creates an influential effect. Morgan (2001) reported many terrorist organisations, including Al-Qaeda, have powerful sanctions and religious, ethnic, patriotic and inspirational beliefs (e.g. joining the martyrs in paradise) that serve as influential tools to encourage people and to guarantee the execution of plans and arrangements. Any location and circumstance possible, Al-Qaeda as organised crime and terrorist organisation give attention on a trouble-free and non-physically-evident infrastructures including communications, transportations, manpower and other needs. Their purpose is to have no specific physical presence and to keep away from drawing unnecessary attention from people and authorities. Bergen (2001) portrayed the network as a holding company that brings different network partners and various combinations of physical and non-physical assets together in completing various projects. Meanwhile, Laqueur (2001) observed that in the least detach physical presence for Al-Qaeda and its various affiliates is complicated to distinguish provided that the given extent of the co-mingling with other organisations (e.g. Taliban and Islamic, religious schools) is probable. Radu (2002) considered Al-Qaeda as a hybrid, intelligence service/army, and multinational with a flexible workforce compliant to the requirements of several different projects. The above hypothesis of The New York Times reports is supported by Smillie and colleagues (2000, pp. 2-3) by affirming that Al-Qaeda is seen to be an example of organised crime group in terms of its diamond trading in exchange for cash to purchase weapons. This kind of trade facilitated war and provided a disguise cover for all types of organised crime (Smillie et al 2000, pp. 2-3). To further strengthen the above finding, U.S. and European intelligence sources say that over the past years, the network purchased below-market rates diamonds from the Sierra Leone diamond fields, which are very close to the Liberian border, and resold them in various countries in Europe for millions of dollars in profit. The network’s diamonds transaction significantly increased and affected the rise of prices during summer 2001 (Farah 2001). This incident put much of Al-Qaeda’s assets beyond the reach of Western governments particularly that of U.S. and its counterparts. European banking officials believed that Al-Qaeda was able to convert its assets from cash to gold and diamonds before the September 11, 2001 bombings (Frantz 2002). The classification of the network and its extent as form of organised crime is seen in the negotiations on “blood diamonds” and its effect in the overall network’s operations.
Documented intelligence reports from police officials in many countries described international criminal and terror activities were more likely to be organised in network form. This is because the idea of global attack is hard, if not impossible particularly in execution, if it is only attributed to a solitary control system. Smillie and group (2000) considered Al-Qaeda as a terrorist network characterised by overarching or practically unreasonably wide-ranging political goals (e.g., the removal of Crusaders and Jews from the Middle East), collective beliefs and ideology that serves a primary function in integrating very diverse individuals. With unconcealed and concealed networks as evident in all organised activity, a rational transaction between differentiation and integration is ensured to be achieved especially if goal attainment is even an excellent opportunity. Terrorism is clearly the outcome of one such disagreement that can come from outside or any given environment where we live in (Lee 2007). Since the U.S.-led war against terrorism and the overwhelming international response of cooperation and policy-making, Al-Qaeda network and activities are said to be weakened (Gunaratna 2004) and affected by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Sukma 2004, pp. 85). To end, it is apt to acknowledge Gunaratna’s conclusion as it is practically applicable to the topic stating that the global fight against Al-Qaeda and identified linkages headed by the U.S. is emerging and has met with partial success. Looking Al-Qaeda as a form of organised crime is already a common notion that was brought about by various documented occurrences that proved, in one way or the other, the group’s existence is mainly destructive in purpose. Thus, the budding success of the fight against Al-Qaeda and networks or terrorism in general is strictly reliant on the international coalition of political authorities and governments. This is administered by long-term co-operation and coordination to share intelligence and similarly to conduct collaborative operations against terrorist groups and suppress their support bases to fully reach the ultimate desire for world peace. In conclusion, the extent of Al-Qaeda as an organised crime is seen on the nature of its framework as network of organisation involving various countries and nationalities where co-operation is an indispensable feature; the state of affairs and activities involving their planned destructive and politically inclined agenda; and its overall consequences to the condition of national and international communities particularly on peace, order, and security.
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