BRITISH ROYAL AIR FORCE AND ITS CAPACITY TO MEET THE JOINT OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE
Table of Contents


I.      Introduction.. 3


II.     Air force and Operational Level.. 4


III.        Air Force and Joint Operations.. 5


IV.       Power to Protect.. 6


A.    Historical Milestones of the British Royal Air Force. 7


B.    Training and Development. 8


C.    Revolutionary Technology. 9


D.    Cooperativeness. 11


E.    Integration. 12


F.     Enhancing Skills. 13


G.    Training for Joint Operations. 14


H.    Issues on Manpower. 14


I.      Higher Expenditure on Maintenance. 15


J.     Impacts of Future Asymmetric Threats. 16


K.    Possible Suggestions. 17


V.    Addressing the Military Requirements.. 18


A.    Clarity on the Requirements Procedure. 19


B.    Possible Drawbacks. 20


C.    Hunt for Answers. 21


D.    Possible Suggestions. 22


VI.       Logistical Requirements from the British Royal Air Force   23


A.    Current Situation. 24


B.    Possible Suggestions. 25


VII.      Conclusion.. 26


VIII.     References.. 26



 
I.                   Introduction

The evolution of modern aircraft has influenced society’s current state. Commercially, the use of aircrafts has revolutionised the way man travel. It made intercontinental voyages timelier, thus advancing a faster pace in dealing with business. In the context of military aviation, the use of aircrafts has been a part of modern warfare. Be it used in attacks or surveillance, the use of aircrafts turn out to be one of the most effective ways of carrying out military objectives. In World War II, the British Royal Air Force was in the forefront in both defence and assault of enemy forces. The English’s use of such machines established the importance of air power in modern warfare. With the advancement of technology and other changes in society at this day and age, one has to wonder if the British Royal Air Force has been able to cope up with the speedy alterations and modifications required in establishing and maintaining its strength in the air. Being one of the most influential countries in the modern world, UK relies heavily on its military might to project its political influence in the international arena. The country uses it not only as a means to protect its borders, it is also utilised as a means to advance its foreign relations with other superpowers in the modern world. Treaties, alliances, and joint operations have become part and parcel of the UK armed forces’ function thus exposing them to other armed forces around the globe. This study intends to look at the capability and existing condition of the British Royal Air Force (RAF) in meeting the challenges that these joint operations offer. The preceding discussions and arguments are going to be based on articles and books of scholars and academics in military aviation and military science.


 


II.                Air force and Operational Level

The air force is a vital element of the military. In the work of Douched (2006) provided several basic truths on the importance of maintaining an air force. He claims that warfare has been revolutionized by the creation of aircrafts. With the liberty held by airplanes in directing attacks, it is held as one of the most effective tools in conquering the enemy, especially its ground troops. In the same manner, he also described that an air force will allow an offensive weapon for the state with the possibility of having an assault virtually on ubiquitous disposition. Thus, the command of the air is essentially one of the basic necessities that Douched cleaves on that countries seeks to prevail in a war.


 


However, modern times demand other areas in the Air Force to be taken into consideration. In particular, issues on the operational level are to be taken into account. The operation level indicated in this context is the direction towards which the resources of the military are heading. Basically this level intends to achieve the strategic objectives of the military. In the case of the RAF, the Air Warfare Centre holds the responsibility in providing the required support that the RAF requires in the Operational level.


 


On the other hand, the creation of the Defence Logistics Organisation (DO) has also been a welcome addition to the operational capabilities of the RAF. It is composed of approximately 41,000 individuals both Service and civilian. (Dye, 2001) It is primary purpose is to maximise the trade-offs that the military could acquire in terms of effectiveness, time and the entire life cost of the equipment of the military by implementing the Smart Procurement Initiative (SIP).          


 


III.              Air Force and Joint Operations

The idea of jointers readily presents a positive attribute in the operations of the military. It is often placed as an equivalent to concepts of efficiency and fluid operations. The Services present in the Queen’s Army possess inherent strengths that effectively implement this state of jointers among the entire force. To illustrate, the Royal Air Force is the part of the Services that controls the air medium in times of war. As compared to the other services, the objective of the Air Force is to actually control the air space dimension. This means that compared to the army’s and navy’s use of the air space dimension, which is actually to gain territory or to secure the operations of the sea vessels, the Air Force maintains power over the enemy through air space.


 


According to the second edition of the Joint Operations Execution (2004), the United Kingdom adheres to two areas of joint operations for its effective implementation: competency and logistics. In the context of competency, UK accepts five central elements that will ensure success for joint operations: Joint Force Maritime, Land, Air, SF and logistics. Along with the addition of trust, goodwill, prior training, and joint exercising, a balanced and clear relationship between the Services is needed to fulfil the requirements for success. In the context of logistics, the consignment of responsibility between agencies like the Permanent Joint Headquarters, Defence Logistics Organisation, Front Line Commands, and the Joint Force Logistic Component defines the doctrine UK implements in joint operations.


 


IV.            Power to Protect

In establishing the actual capacity of the British Royal Air Force in combating the problems that joint operations advance, it is important to present the actual strengths of the military unit. Specifically, these strengths are indicated in this part of the paper are those which has been accumulated over the years since its inception in 1918. In presenting such instances, the discussion will be able to provide particular areas in which the British Royal Air Force may improve. In the same way, the presentation of areas of strength will also present specific attributes of the air force that should be maintained such that it will only follow a path of development.


 


In this part, the discussions will look on the strength presented by the British Royal Air Force throughout history. Another part will focus on the development of leaders in the military unit as well as the instruction provided such that future leaders are mould. In the same manner, the addition of modern technology in the force will also be taken into consideration. Particularly, the discussion will cover the capability of adapting innovations and how it is used in joint operations. Related to that, a part depicting the level of cooperatives of the British Royal Air Force will be discussed. This will be seen in its conduct with other branches of the armed forces and the armed forces of its allied countries. Moreover, issues on training, manpower, and finances will be dealt with in this part of the paper.  


 


A.   Historical Milestones of the British Royal Air Force

The dominance of airpower has changed the way war is carried out. In the words of Hellion (1997, 3-4) dominance, parity, and subordination are among the basic requirements in which command of the air demands. History has presented the strength of the RAF in battle. Milestone after milestone, it established UK as one of the dominant countries of command in air. One of the highlight of the airpower of UK is the unification of its two air services in 1918: the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service. (British Royal Air Force, 2007, 26) With its inception in the middle of World War I, the birth of the military unit has been tumultuous to a certain extent.


 


Most of the doctrines in which the RAF adheres to were established during World War I. Specifically, the creation of the Independent Force in 1918. This triggered one of the well-accepted ideas in military warfare in directly attacking the capability of the opposing party to carry on in building its war machinery. (Hellion, 1997, p6) In a sense, this has been employed in the subsequent battles in which the British Royal Air Force was involved in, especially in World War II. This was an effective means of “bending the will” and “breaking the capacity” of an enemy to fight. (Malinger, 1997, 41)


 


Between the great wars in the modern world, Great Britain held the best air force in the world. The superiority of the RAF at the said period has triggered a race to rearm and prepare for another war. When the Second World War came about, other countries have matched, and even surpassed, the strength of the air power of the country. Regardless of the turmoil in the political element covering the RAF, it has survived the ravages of war particularly because of the training and experience provided to its personnel. The expansion that took place in the early parts of the 1930s has not compromised this element in the RAF. (Richard and Saunders, 1953, 5) The details of this capability are to be discussed in the following part.              


 


B.   Training and Development

In the fast paced world of today, leadership presents itself as a challenge to manage this intense change. (Reined, nod.) This is possibly a universal phenomenon with the RAF experiencing similar predicaments and needs of leaders in its helm. In this context, the RAF, through Hugh Trencher, has found a way to establish and maintain the skills necessary and required from the personnel of the military unit. The creation of Royal Air Force College (RAFF) in Cranel provided a venue where proper instruction on both technical and theoretical aspects that future officers may encounter. With thirty-two week duration, the cadets are placed in rigorous training before they are placed under the commission of the RAF.


 


On a similar note, the RAF itself has an internal scheme wherein the personnel are also trained is such a way that specific attributes of the individual is enhanced. According to the Air Force Strategy of 2006, commissioned personnel in RAF are to experience individual development through the personnel and lifestyle plan. Specifically, training that will balance both the operational assurance and personal flexibility of the servicemen. Moreover, it similarly mentioned the Force Development training scheme and Review of Officer and Airman Development geared towards enhancing the leadership and warship capabilities of RAF.


 


C.   Revolutionary Technology

According to Lambeth (2000, 6), the cornerstones of dominance in air power includes stealth, high accuracy from standoff ranges, and information dominance. In modern warfare, these are the essential elements that will enable a military unit to actually gain dominance over the other countries. According to the website of the RAF, they are in the process of creating new aircrafts and weapons that will essentially complement these elements.


 


The RAF has been among the top countries with regards to using stealth settings. To illustrate, it has made plans to acquire the pilot less combat aircrafts. These are to be used alongside the unmanned aerial vehicles (Eaves) that are currently in the roster of aircrafts held by the RAF. In the context of high accuracy weapons, the RAF has long range and short range weapons as well as anti-shipping missiles. The long range weapons includes the Air Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM) which was used during the Gulf War in 1991, the Brimstone armed in its Tornado GR4s, and the Storm Shadow/Conventionally Armed Stand Off Missile (CAROM). The last weapon is highly accurate with a preloaded data of the mission data as well as the details of the targets, even those hard to locate like buried command centers. Anti-shipping weapons owned by the UK include the Harpoon AGM-84D and the Stingray. Both are used for sea based vessels and are infused with homing systems that will enable them to make another attack on the target if it missed the first time.


 


In the context of intelligence gathering, the RAF also has its own breed of gadgets. One is the Digital Joint Reconnaissance Pod (DRIP). This is used as a reconnaissance mechanism, mounted on RAF’s Jaguar GR3A, and provides real-time 3d images to the home base. Another reconnaissance instrument is the Reconnaissance Airborne Pod for Tornado (RAPTOR). This is mounted on the RAF Tornado GR4, it provides high resolution images of specific targets in recon missions.


 


D.   Cooperativeness

The ability of the armed forces of UK to act together as one single unit in battle has been documented throughout the battles that they have endured over the years. The high quality of the armed forces’ operations has considerably undoubted with a long legacy of superiority in the field of battle. However, there is this possibility that the effectiveness and seemingly cohesive operations are based on mere personal liaison with the officers in the theatre of war. There are still flaws in the design of the joint operations in the UK armed forces.


 


This could be seen in the joint operations held in Dessert Storm, particularly in the expeditionary sense of the operations. (Thompson, 2004) It was in this area where the RAF realised that it was helpless without an “operational-level system of fixed command and control and infrastructure.” This means that this dependence held back the capabilities of the RAF in providing any air support. This was not only seen in RAF but also in the other branches of UK armed forces. Thus, this prompted Thomson (2004) to actually claim that there was, by no means, the absence of any synergy and semblance of cooperation among the UK armed forces.


 


This was addressed in the creation of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PHI) in 1996. (Thompson, 2004) This mainly covers any other joint operations of the military where “intelligence, planning, operations, and logistics staffs” are based, all of whom are tasked to carry out joint operations as smooth as possible. Headed by the Chief of Joint Operations (CO) the body’s main task is to implement planned military operations which the UK serves as the head. Such missions include joint operations with NATO, United Nations, and European Union.   


E.   Integration

The RAF is involved with several joint operations with the Army and the Royal Navy. One such operation is the Joint Force Harrier. (Royal Navy, 2007) This joint operation is held alongside with the Royal Navy. Specifically, the Royal Navy provides the aircraft carriers (Invincible Class Carriers) to accommodate the Harrier GR7s of the RAF. This is an addition to the adoption of the military to the trend towards expeditionary warfare. Moreover, it is successfully implemented during the Gulf War in 1991. Other operations involving the Joint Force Harrier include the aid in stabilising Sierra Leone in 2000. (Royal Air Force, 2007)


 


Another joint operation is seen in the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. (Royal Navy, 2007) It is described as a collection of “mobile, hard-hitting units for rapid action.” In a similar manner, they are used as a means to provide humanitarian relief in other parts of the globe. (Royal Air Force, 2007)


 


One more existing joint operations between the three Services includes the Joint Helicopter Command. (Royal Navy, 2007) It is an operations where “Commando Helicopter Force of 845, 846, 847, 848 Naval Air Squadrons flying Sea King Mk4, Lynx Mk7 and Gazelle helicopters” are employed. It is in this operation that the RAF helicopter pilots receive its first hands-on training in flying aircrafts. (Royal Air Force, 2007)   


 


F.    Enhancing Skills

In the article of Thomson (2004) it appears that the Gulf War has become the turning point of RAF in the sense that it came to a realisation that it required improvement. Thompson (2004) claimed that not only RAF but also the entire Armed Forces of UK require developments in terms of “deployability” and “joinery.” This means that the readiness of the entire armed forces is held in need of improvement as seen in the events after Dessert Storm.


 


In 1998, the leadership in UK ratified its Strategic Defence Review (SIR) that analyses the needs that UK armed forces need to improve on in the coming years. (Thompson, 2004) The SIR presented several objectives. These include responding to a major international crisis; undertaking a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale; and rebuilding a larger force as a component of NATO’s group.”


 


An offshoot of the SIR is the creation of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JAR). This has been the archetypical standard that UK provided in the international scene. The JAR are servicemen who are trained specifically for contingency measures and for joint operations of the UK armed forces. This initiative has also been carried over on the RAF as the Joint Force Air Component Headquarters (UK FOCH) were created in 2000. (Thompson, 2004)   


G.  Training for Joint Operations

As stated in the earlier parts of the paper, joint exercises with other Services are constantly being held to improve the relationship and coordination between the branches of the Queen’s Army. However, an equally important note to include in the training for joint military operations includes the training of J1 (Personnel) servicemen in the PHI. Specifically, the training involves the essentials in joint operations like the creation of planning programmes and joint operational standards. (Interim Joint Warfare Publication, 2003)


 


H.   Issues on Manpower

One of the possible issues that the RAF may have encountered is the recruitment and retention of qualified personnel within their ranks. The recent military actions on Central Asia have acquired a whole lot of criticisms from the public sector, thus spawning a very adverse representation of the armed forces in general. This may have aggravated the recruitment troubles that they are encountering. To some extent, voluntary enlistment in the armed forces may only be likely if an individual actually has a family with military history.


 


Skilled personnel and servicemen are required in the force to meet the changing needs of the RAF. Technological skills are now imperative for candidates such that majority of the operations of the RAF includes exposure in hi-tech gadgetry. Problems in instilling commitment on the part of the existing employees of the RAF should also be taken into consideration. As seen in the Air Force Strategy of 2006, the RAF is doing its best to retain the servicemen by providing them with incentives like training and housing schemes aside from the very lucrative pay they receive from the government. On the other hand, the recruitment in military colleges like those in Cranel similarly provides programmes appealing to the young adult. Free education and guaranteed high rank is offered after each cadet has graduated from their respective courses.


 


I.        Higher Expenditure on Maintenance

The reforms provided by the SIR and other modernisation campaigns held by the RAF in improving its military capabilities have spawned another issue. With the acquisition of highly technological weaponry and aircrafts, one could not discount the massive costs it has incurred in its purchase or creation alone. To boot, further expenditures are to be expected after the purchase, basically because the RAF have to constantly monitor and maintain the quality and efficiency of these military assets. Maintenance costs thus incur one of the highest liabilities of ensuring the military strength of UK. Keeping a close watch on the aircrafts and weapons of the RAF contributes more to the objective of deploy ability and joinery required by the SIR.


 


In a 2001 study made by Dye (2001), he indicated that the logistical support required maintaining the Tornado fleet of RAF annually is one billion pounds alone. Such an amount is necessary to maintain the operational competence of the said aircrafts. In the same way, the RAF has sought to reduce its maintenance costs by acquiring new and upgraded aircrafts. The military unit carried this out first by phasing out the rather aging aircrafts. In this manner, they could reduce the support cost considering that old and corroded planes are much harder and much more expensive to sustain, with even lower probability of having operational competence as compared to the newer machines.         


 


J.    Impacts of Future Asymmetric Threats

According to the Joint Warfare Publication (2003) there are three asymmetric threats facing the air defence capabilities of RAF. These include the proliferation of theatre missiles (Tams) and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons (NIBCO); use of theatre missiles; and improvements in technology. The Air Force created several principles such that they could deal with the said threats effectively. These include integration, force protection, and prioritisation. In integration, the RAF has to integrate the systems surrounding Tams with the command and control (C2) capabilities of the service. This means a much wider global surveillance and TM warning capabilities are being developed by the RAF. In the context of force protection, RAF intends to carry this out by providing measured assessments of the existing threats; risk management; creation of a joint and multinational concept addressing the threat; establishing priorities for force protection; and flexibility. In the area of prioritisation, the RAF covers two major areas: assets that are important for defence and population centres of the country.


 


K.   Possible Suggestions

On the above discussions, several suggestions come to mind. First, the RAF should focus more on the recruitment and retention of capable servicemen in the force. According to Dye (2004), over the last twenty years, the RAF has suffered a considerable loss in its human resource. With over 90,000 in the late eighties, the population of servicemen in RAF shrivelled to more or less fifty thousand uniformed individuals. Schemes such as incentive programmes and housing projects should be sustained such that these capable individuals wouldn’t have to consider leaving the force for private employment.


 


Though it appears that the modernization of the military requirements is rather within the pace that the government requires, it has been lagging behind other countries like the US and China. Failure in placing equal footing with these superpowers may be seen as a result of the serious suppression of financing from political entities. Private funding still appears unappealing to some parts of the public sector, thus placing it out of the alternatives for financial support.


 


Furthermore, the logistic needs of the RAF should also be taken into consideration. The capability of the support group within the RAF should constantly be enhanced such that the technological skills demanded from these servicemen would be at par with the rest of the world. In the same manner, it would also be one of the key factors in providing efficiency and reducing issues on joint operations in the future.       


 


V.   Addressing the Military Requirements

The context in which this part will cover includes the role of the Ministry of Defence in helping the RAF and the rest of the Armed Forces of UK in acquiring the necessary requirements in their operations. With the principles held by UK regarding air control, it is important to see whether the government is actually doing its share in realising this objective. The discussions in this part of the paper will include the clarifications of the actual procedures in acquiring the requirements needed by the RAF. In presenting the process, the possible drawbacks could also be uncovered. Subsequently, the courses of action in which the RAF undertakes will be taken into account, particularly in terms of addressing the indicated drawbacks of the acquisition process. In the end of this part of the paper, the personal suggestions of the author will be provided based on the discussions and arguments noted.


 


A.   Clarity on the Requirements Procedure

In the recent developments in the international scene, the UK government has acquired several initiatives that are geared towards the general improvements in the Armed Forces. Specifically, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) have take steps in improving the procurement processes of military requirements as a result of the review presented in the SIR in 1998. (Dye, 2001) Two such important initiatives include the Smart Procurement Initiative (SIP) and the creation of the Defence Logistics Organization (DO). Both initiatives sought to create a more efficient way of delivering the requirements needed in the RAF and the entire Armed Forces as well.


 


In the case of the SIP, the initiative provides a venue for the government to establish a closer connection to certain industries involved in the provision of military requirements. Specifically, the programme is basically a way to provide a more in-depth review on the acquisition of assets like weapons and aircrafts used by the military units like the RAF. (Dye, 2001) Lower costs and efficiency are basically the aim of the initiative. At this point, there are hundreds of integrated project teams (Pits) that helps the MoD in monitoring and implementing measures that will improve the deploy ability and joinery of the entire armed forces.     


 


The DO on the other hand has changed the earlier practice of independent logistic management for the individual parts of the UK armed forces. (Dye, 2001) In the creation of the DO, the task of implementing an effective control chain is held by the Chief of Defence Logistics (CDN). All in all, the directive of such an organisation is to establish a strong base for the military units like the RAF in terms of logistics planning. And more importantly, it is the Do’s task to effectively implement the SIP in the entire armed forces.   


 


B.   Possible Drawbacks

In looking at the courses of action held by the MoD, the creation of the DO has made it the sole authority in the logistics operations of the entire UK armed forces. Thus, the logistics operations of the armed forces are subjected to a centralised system. This means that the acquisition of military requirements may face possible setbacks and delays caused by red tape.


 


This also means that there is a possibility that all the units of the Queen’s Army may have to compete with each other for resources. Although there is a possibility that this competition may spawn innovation among the Services, it may also be harmful in the sense that the possibility of the competition being unhealthy may ensue.


 


Worse case of this unhealthy competition would be that the acquisition of military requirements becomes highly political. This means that the favour of the Chief of Defence Logistics is up for grabs, and not as to whether one unit merits the approval of such requirement. This may be possible because the Chief of Defence Logistics has the power to grant or deny any requisition held by the units of the armed forces. He/she just have to justify as to whether the denial or approval works in favour of the ends on which the kingdom aims.


 


C.   Hunt for Answers

The discussions above has indicated that there is a conflict between considering a centralised system or proposing a decentralised system in the logistics operations of the Armed Forces. However, this paper calls for merely striking a balance between the two processes. It is the contention of this paper that the potentials on which this initiative is to establish a level of flexibility for the DO. In this sense, it is in the commission of the DO that this balance be implemented. The DO along with the leadership of the CDN should maintain a degree of equilibrium through the use of transparency and efficiency.


 


In placing the claim for balance, this paper does not seek any inclination towards the setting prior to the creation of the SIP and the DO, it merely seeks transparency and equal treatment to the provision of requirements of military resources. Though the said organisation is still bound by formal procedures and compelled to carry out strict precedence on the approval and denial of requirements, in-depth deliberation should be warranted from the said body and nothing else. Being the central facilitator of the logistics of the armed forces, it is important that they equate the importance of their post with the decisions that they intend to formulate. And in the end, this might trigger an impetus to the reduction of redundant processes and give way to substantial developments in the RAF and the rest of the Queen’s Army.  


 


D.   Possible Suggestions

As stated in the earlier parts of the paper, the position held by the CDN and the DO has the propensity to be highly political. In this sense, the parliament should formulate a particular guideline that will establish the transparency of every decision that the DO generates in terms of the provision of military requirements.


 


In the same manner, it is recommended that the DO itself should open its communication lines such that the issues of red tape and inefficiency would be addressed to some degree. An open line of communication from every unit of the Queen’s Army would not only allow transparency, to a certain extent it would also advance the objective of joinery that the SIR has constantly advocated. The DO may well be the bond that could actually represent true and genuine jointers and cooperation between the Services.


 


In relations to the above suggestion, it is also recommended that the DO establish a mandate that will be able to unite the operations of the Services. Particularly, it is recommended that it establish programmes that would integrate the operations of the Queen’s Army. In this manner, opportunities for more joint operations would be available for the Armed Forces. This means that the additional presence of these joint operations would strengthen the cooperation and collective functions of the military, thus, reducing the possibilities of problems occurring in the future.   


 


IV.Logistical Requirements from the British Royal Air Force

A discussion on the capability of a military unit would not be complete without an account of the logistical capacity and situation. In the earlier parts of the paper, there has been a perceptible drive towards a more expeditionary means of warfare. (Brady, 2000) In commonsensical terms, one of the vital requirements for military dominance in the modern world is the actual capacity to get into the battle itself. As seen in the joint operations in the recent military actions held in Afghanistan, Iraq, and even as far back as the Gulf War, strong armies have the logistical capacity to get into battle, regardless of the rigorous conditions of the environment.


 


In the case of the RAF, the aim towards more deployable units is a move towards the adaptation of such demands on expeditionary battles. In addition, the creation of the UK FOCH complements the intention of the country to level with the capabilities of countries like the US. As indicated in the previous parts, there have been institutional changes specifically pointing towards the reform of the logistics capability of the RAF and the rest of the Queen’s Army.  


 


A.   Current Situation

The demands of an expeditionary warfare have considerably altered the way military operations are conducted. Unlike those that took place during the Cold War, which presents a large scale scenario that eventually eroded the capacity of the former Soviet, expeditionary warfare demands small yet mobile forces deployable once a the call is given. (Dye, 2001) And an added feature of this evolution in warfare is the rather constricted time-frame in which provides military units huge logistical predicaments.


 


According to the Air Force Strategy of 2006, the RAF has introduced the Expeditionary Air Groups and Expeditionary Air Wings to deal with the demands of joint operations which normally hold expeditionary battles. It is also indicated in the said document that the purpose of the scheme is twofold. The first is to make politicians and other units of the Queen’s Army recognise specific RAF elements that are deployable. Another objective is to create a bond among the units such that each and every part would be able to be unified. A more specific intention of the plan is to establish the RAF base in Al Died as the Expeditionary Air Group while other bases like   assigned as Expeditionary Air Wing. In establishing a core group that has the capacity to deploy air units, the RAF is on its way to retain its glory days in air power.  


 


B.   Possible Suggestions

The easy deployment of the fighter planes may not be possible unless the RAF maintains a course of improvement in their maintenance and repair of the aircrafts. What they could do is to establish a support chain that would be linked with its allies. A constant logistic support with the SUAVE would be a good start in establishing this support chain. In addition to that, this would also allow the relationship between the allied forces particularly on the operations to strengthen. Thus, this would provide a means to facilitate the joint operations that UK and US may undertake in the future. Moreover, this will also provide an opportunity to lessen the anomalies that could come up as a result of differing operational procedures implemented by the organisations.           


 


Internally, the RAF should also install additional logistical depots to make the deploy ability of the force be more effective. The DO should be able to find a way to locate strategic points where these depots should be installed. Moreover, the operational maintenance of the RAF should also be taken into consideration. It should keep the operations responsive and at the same time prolong the life expectance of the aircrafts and weapons held by the RAF through proper maintenance and repair.       


 


 


VII.          Conclusion  

The history and heritage of the RAF has been one held highly by the rest of the military aviation units the world over. However, it also apparent that even the best Air Force in history should instigate changes within its ranks. Fortunately, as seen in the discussions above, the Service is able to cope up with the rapidly changing times, especially in the past decade. The RAF has held a pedigree in air power and should be able to sustain it in the coming future.


 


With the demands of modern warfare changing, the role of RAF in protecting the interest of the free world has given it a responsibility not only on the citizen of UK, but with the rest of the globe. As military activities develop more into a joint effort among allied countries, the need to improve and to adapt is also imperative for the RAF. With policy changes and expert military officers holding on sensitive positions, the British Royal Air Force will always be there to fulfil the security needs of the kingdom and the rest of humanity.



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