I.       INTRODUCTION

The law enforcement of the United Kingdom contributes to the whole lot of the perpetuation of the democratic order in the nation. All have objectives and collective guiding principles generally geared towards the protection of the citizens and the Crown. No matter how noble the intentions and how effective they implement these ends, individual efforts from these law enforcement bodies may only achieve their goals in a limited degree. Joint operations are thus necessary, indispensable even, in carrying out the mandate of such organizations. This study intends to discuss that issue particularly in the case of the British Royal Navy. In the same manner, the discussions regarding the joint capabilities of the other forces in the United Kingdom will be taken into account.  


 


A.   HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY

 


B.   INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

 


C.   UNITED KINGDOM POLICY

 


II.    FUTURE THREAT

 


A.   CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

 


B.   TOURISM

 


C.   ASYMMETRIC WAR

 


III.  INTEGRATION BETWEEN FORCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

Joint Operations in the military is one of the directives held closely by the Services in UK. The creation of programmes and schemes by the armed forces has been done to strengthen the integration capabilities of the Services. The following discussions present some of the established joint programmes held by the services. In the same manner, the discussion will present the framework in which the operational level of the joint forces of the UK is founded.   


 


A.   JOINT FORCE HARRIER

The Joint Fore Harrier (JFH) is one of the joint operations held by both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. The Royal Navy’s Invincible Class Carriers are the main contribution of the service in this endeavour. These aircraft carriers serve as the remote bases of the joint forces with the Royal Navy in charge of the accommodation of the Harriers GR7s. Along with the RAF, the Royal Navy is at the disposal of the operations held by the Joint Force Harrier. They could also be taken in the helm of NATO actions and initiatives in the international level. This is similarly one of the attempts of the Armed Forces to address the continuing trend of expeditionary warfare.


 


B.   JOINT HELICOPTER COMMAND

The Joint Helicopter Command is a combination of both ground and air elements from the British Army, Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy. The initiative is also an offshoot of the Strategic Defence Review put into effect in 1991. The initiative has triggered an unprecedented combination and integration of both Aviation Attack and Combat Support resources of the Services. Basically, the main focus of this initiative is to provide support using the helicopter command controlled by the military.


 


The main contribution of the Royal Navy at this point is the provision of support helicopters that they mange. This is composed of four squadrons (845, 846, 847, 848) carrying Sea King HC4s, Lynx AH7s, and Gazelles. Collectively, these squadrons are called the Commando Helicopter Force (CHF) under the command of the HQ Land. The addition of the Royal Navy in this initiative shows the capability of the said service to provide a degree of amphibious character for the force. Specifically, the RN have provided landing docks capable of handling the needs of the helicopters from the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force.


 


C.   JOINT RAPID REACTION FORCE

Quick and immediate reaction, these are among the major requirement of modern warfare. The Ministry of Defence have taken steps in realising these requirements such that the services are able to contend with the demands of modern warfare. The creation of the Strategic Defence Review served as an impetus in creating a joint effort between the three services in creating a pool of military units readily available for action. This gave birth to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force.


 


In general, the joint operations held by this programme seek to attend short-notice military actions. This also mean that the actions taken are normally medium-scale and not as grand as war theatres similar to the Dessert Storm held in 1991. Moreover, it could also be used to handle relief operations aiding disaster-ridden areas all over as directed by either the NATO, or coalition forces from the EU and UN. Thus, the Royal Navy, aside from being under the auspices of the Crown, are also subject to launch echelons for other international organisations.


 


Being in charge of majority of the transportation and mobility of the armed forces, the Royal Navy has contributed much to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. With its capability of carrying equipment, aircrafts (helicopter and jet fighters), and servicemen, the Royal Navy has control over the resources that are deemed vital for the success of the operations.


 


D.   STRATEGIC EFFECT OF THE JOINT OPERATIONS

The joint operations held by the British Forces have significant implications not only in the national front, but also with the rest of the world as well. The strategic effects of the joint operations are indicated in the Joint Operation Publications (2004). Specifically, there are eight perceived strategic effects held in the said publication. It indicated that the Ministry of Defence have taken measures to steer clear from the protection of individual interest and take on a more solid stance in involving itself in the global scene. One such strategic effect held by the joint operations is to prevent. This means that the operations are geared towards “fostering regional and national security.” This intention is to be achieved by addressing instability, reducing the production of weapons (WMEs), advocate security reform, build a capable force that would deal with local crises, and encourage such an initiative to the international sector.


 


Another strategic effect held by the joint operations of the British Armed Forces is to stabilise. Interagency and jointness in this initiative is stressed by the publication. Moreover, the end intention of this strategic effect is to establish a “set and stable” environment needed to re-establish a normalcy. Along with political and economic endeavours, military actions are thus required to reassure, reconstruct, and provide help for the state. The third strategic effect is to contain an adversary or a crisis. This means that the direct involvement of the military and the consequent joint operation endeavours are required. In some instances, it is indicated that the military involvement may act as the third party. To deter is the third strategic effect. This is an attempt to use proper communication of the possible effects and possible costs of an action held by an adversary. In this effect, the crisis or adversary is restrained from using its influence or further effect in public through proper dissuasion.


 


The fifth effect is somewhat an extreme version of the formed strategic effect. This effect intends to coerce the crisis or an adversary. The joint operations of UK intend to use such force or use it as a threat to force a crisis or an adversary into submission. In order to make this possible for the British Army, an establishment of a credible army and an effective communication in clarifying a basic course of action that the country intends is required. Along with these, it is also important that a clear political will from UK should be formed such that the strategic effect is properly implemented.


 


The joint operation endeavours of UK also seek to disrupt the overall capability of an adversary. In this context, the freedom of the adversary’s wherewithal to act in retaliation or even advance an offensive towards UK is taken away through military actions. These actions could be indirect or direct. This means that the joint forces could attack head on with the adversary’s offensive or there even take away the adversary’s capability or willingness to tread on with the battle. This brings about the discussion to the strategic effect of defeat. In disrupting the capacity of the adversary to further fight, a subsequent consequence is peace time brought about by the end of fighting. It is at this point that the joint operations advance the political objectives put forth by the Kingdom. The last strategic effect is to destroy an enemy state or non-state enemy. At this point, the ability of the adversary to build up an action worthy of retaliation is no longer possible. The resources or even the actual framework of holding the state or non-state enemy of UK is totally confounded by the joint operations advanced by the military. In this instance, the possibility of returning to further hostilities is unlikely.          


  


E.   OPERATIONAL LEVEL

All the services operating under the UK flag have to work together as one unit such that the political and national principles held by the country is held firmly. The operational level at which the Royal Navy is included embraces the link on which the other forces’ tactical actions complete the inclusive accomplishment of the British Defence Doctrine. The operational level at which the services employ have several characteristics: freedom of action; joint and multinational; application of resources; total effect and public support.


 


All these characteristics are held together such that the operational head commander will be able to maximise the potential of the joint operations. In this aspect, he will be able to mesh together the entire capacities seeking to realise the initiatives held by the state. The following discussion will present the framework of the Operational Level held by the joint operations of the military in UK. This description of the held below will also indicate the role of the Royal Navy in building this framework of the joint operations.     


 


1.     Manoeuverist Approach

 


The Manoeuverist approach is a strategy held closely by the British military. It is characterised as an operation seeking to destroy the cohesion held by an adversary by means of orchestrated actions. These actions tend to create really violent repercussions for the adversary thus weakening its ability to retaliate or launch another attack. According to the Joint Operation Publications (2004), this approach held by the British Joint Forces cleaves to four aspects that essentially execute and visualise the framework. Stated in the publication includes four actions: shape, attack, protect, and exploit. The Royal Navy, being one of the integral elements of the joint operations, has also been able to contribute to this framework. The following initiatives are discussed on the items below. It is in this section where the services rendered by the Royal Navy will be presented.   


a)    Shaping the Environment

This part of the framework indicates the command and control needed by the UK military to essentially dissuade the adversary, state or non-state, in carrying on their actions. Specifically, the strategy held in this level is to create an image that will generally make an adversary think twice in carrying out their resolve. The strategy takes on the ability of the military to communicate their capability and by removing any means of security on the part of the enemy. This makes them susceptible to attacks from the joint forces.


 


In this context, the Royal Navy could help in the information operation (Info Ops) in eroding the motivation of the adversary. They could provide intelligence for the Info Ops to use in forming information that will demoralise the enemy. Such information could be anything that will promote doubt and uncertainty on the part of the enemy. Another course of action that the Royal Navy could do is to perform exercises that will present the powers and capabilities of their force. A spot on the media (be it in the television, radio, or newspaper) would be helpful in establishing the strength of the Royal Navy not only for its adversaries but also for the citizen of UK and the rest of the world. Such spots could be a report on the upgrading of the aircrafts held by the Invincible Class Carriers or the munitions advancement research that is taking place for improving the defence capabilities of its carriers. Other forms such as internet articles and improving its website could present a media opportunity for the Royal Navy in shaping the perception of the public on the military potentials that the Royal navy could contribute in the joint operations of UK and its other alliances.    


  


b)    Destroying the Capabilities of the Enemy

In this framework, holds true to the manoeuvrist approach where the assault on the cohesion of the adversary is targeted on the weakest point, not with the strengths held by the company. It is the areas where the adversary’s cohesion rest on that should be taken into consideration. These are the areas where military actions should be targeted; it these areas that if attacked, could destroy the very essence of the adversary’s resolve.


 


The joint forces have takes strategic plans in establishing this component. Such elements of the framework include the synchronisation of firepower and manoeuvre; tempo and simultaneity; surprise; and asymmetric warfare. Synchronisation of firepower and manoeuvre basically pertains to strategic bombing. In the case of the Royal Navy, they are able to fulfil this element through the Joint Force Harrier and the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. Constant exercise with the other Services reinforces the capability to strike strategically in joint operations. In the context of tempo and simultaneity, it essentially points to driving the adversary to the point where it doesn’t have any more options but to surrender. This may be caused by the use of all the resources held by the force and thus implementing a level of jointness that no other country could surpass. The element of surprise is seen by the joint operations of UK as an important aspect of their strategy. Timing is everything in this category. The adversary has to be caught ignorant of any action. This could be implemented by the Royal Navy by using its submarines and its special forces in carrying out certain missions. Stealth and secrecy will be the advantage held by the Royal Navy which will be seen in the capabilities discussed in the latter part of the paper.


 



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